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COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTY UNDER  
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
ABSTRACT
This Article investigates the nature of the right to property guaranteed under the 
First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights ('P1-1').  It argues that the 
European Court of Human Rights has been torn between two theories of the right to 
property.  The first is the "integrated theory", and it holds that the right to property shares 
common values and purposes with other Convention rights.  Hence, the interpretation of 
P1-1 should reflect principles developed in the interpretation of other Convention rights.  
It is argued that the application of the integrated theory should support a "social model" 
of property.  The second theory is the "comparative theory".  It tends to look outside the 
Convention, to the comparative law on rights of property, for guidance on the 
interpretation of P1-1.  Implicitly, it rejects the notion that there is a strong link between 
the right to property and other Convention rights.  In addition, it supports the use of either 
a "legal model" or an "economic model" of property in the application of P1-1.   
The Article demonstrates that the rhetoric of Court of Human Rights follows the 
integrated theory, but the development of substantive doctrine more often reflects the 
comparative theory.  It shows this by exploring the development of the implied right to 
compensation for the expropriation of property.  There is no express guarantee of 
compensation in P1-1, and hence the development of compensation principles provides 
insight into the Court's views on the nature of the interest protected by a human right to 
property.   
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INTRODUCTION
This Article asks whether the right to property, as a human right, serves the same 
general purpose as other human rights.  It does so by examining the standards relating to 
compensation for deprivations of property under the European human rights system.  If 
property is protected for similar reasons as other fundamental rights, the interpretation of 
the right to property should draw upon the principles developed in relation to the 
interpretation of other rights.  However, if the right to property is distinct from other 
human rights, then perhaps guidance on its interpretation should come from comparative 
law, specifically in relation to rights to property that may be found in constitutional law 
or perhaps other international treaties.   
The Article focuses on the work of European Court of Human Rights, primarily 
because it has produced an impressive volume of cases under the right to property 
contained in the First Protocol1 to the European Convention on Human Rights,2 with 
 
1 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952,  Europ. T.S. No. 9 (in force May 18, 1954). Article 1 provides 
as follows:  
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
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most of these in the last thirty years.  Many of these cases deal with compensation, and 
these cases often put questions regarding the purpose of protecting property into sharp 
relief.  This is partly due to the lack of clarity in the Protocol itself.  It declares that 
everyone is "entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions", and that property can 
only be taken in the public interest and according to law, but fails to tell us what we 
really want to know: if the state authorizes the taking of our property, how much money 
will we get?  The Protocol itself appears to say nothing on this crucial point, and hence 
the Court's decisions on compensation provide a particularly valuable insight into its 
views on the right to property.    
It took nearly thirty years for the situation to be clarified, and we can now say that 
Protocol contains an implied right to compensation.  The state must maintain a "fair 
balance" between public and private interests and "normally" this means that it must 
provide compensation that is "reasonably related to the value of the property".3 Further 
investigation would show that market value compensation is required for the typical 
 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.  
2 Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
Amended By Protocol 11, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (in force Sept. 3, 1953).  Case 
reports are available through the database of the European Court of Human Rights, at 
<http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en>.  
3 James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 36 (1986). 
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taking of property for public use.4 There are exceptions, however: as the image of a 
balance suggests, there may be circumstances where the public interest outweighs the 
need to protect the individual's rights.  In such cases, the Protocol "may call for less than 
reimbursement of the full market value".5
But, leaving aside the exceptions, we may ask why the market value should be 
relevant to a human right to property.  The exceptions are important, and are examined in 
this Article, but not to the exclusion of asking why the market value should provide a 
presumptive standard of fairness.  The market reflects the community's perception of 
value, rather than the owner's.6 Adopting it as the standard seems to abandon the idea 
that human rights should protect an area of personal choice, at least where the individual 
does not have the same desires, preferences or plans for their property as the community 
at large. These values are perhaps not so important under constitutional or statutory law 
of every state, or possibly other areas of international law, but human rights law should 
require the community to accept at least some idiosyncratic preferences.  Indeed, this 
seems implicit in the idea of the 'fair balance': it is plainly quite vague, but at least it 
 
4 Scordino v. Italy (No. 1), Appl. No. 36813/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 29, 2006) 
(G.C.). 
5 James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 36; Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 102 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 51 (1986). It falls to the state to justify a departure from the market 
standard: see Scordino, id. 
6 Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and 
Fines As Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 735-37 (1973).   
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appears sufficiently open to allow the Court to consider individual preferences in 
determining whether there has been due respect for property rights. 
An examination of the reasoning in the European cases on compensation reveals 
that there is a serious division over the very nature and function of a human right to 
property. This Article shows that the rhetoric of the Court of Human Rights often 
supports the idea that the right to property shares common values with other Convention 
rights, but a closer examination reveals that it rarely follows through on the full 
implications of this belief.  Instead, compensation standards more often reflect a 
comparative view of the right to property, under which the Court looks outside the 
Convention for guidance, to existing rules of national and international law on property.  
In Part I, the Article opens with a brief review the historical background.  It 
argues that the Protocol was never intended to do more than provide an international 
guarantee that states would adhere to the rule of law when exercising their powers over 
property.  This view eventually gave way to two different and competing visions of the 
right to property.  The Article calls the first the 'integrated theory': it holds that the human 
rights recognized by the Convention and its Protocols reflect common values and are 
subject to common principles.  In particular, the right to property, like other Convention 
rights, is subject to the general principle of proportionality.  This leads to the duty to 
compensate, as a taking without compensation would not strike a fair balance between 
public and private interests.  As explained briefly above, the fair balance principle has 
provided the source of the implied right to compensation. 
The integrated view can be set against the comparative theory of the right to 
property.  It also accepts that the substantive protection of the right to property goes 
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beyond the narrow confines of the rule of law.  However, it bases the compensation 
standard on national legal systems and their existing practices relating to the exercise of 
state power over property.  As states normally provide market value compensation on 
expropriation, and the same standard should apply under the Protocol.  The principles of 
proportionality and fairness that apply to other human rights are not relevant.  While 
these principles may be consistent with principles of national law, and may produce the 
same outcome in many circumstances, but they are not a necessary part of the Court's 
analysis in a specific case.    
While the Court's rhetoric supports the integrated theory and the fair balance test 
that follows from it, Part II asks whether it actually recognizes its full implications.  The 
fair balance test requires the Court to assess the impact of state action on the victim.  In 
order to do so, it must identify the interests that the right to property is intended to 
protect.  Part II sets out three different models of property that the Court employs under 
P1-1, and argues that only one of them – the social model – is consistent with the 
integrated theory.  The social model recognizes the function of property in relation to 
individual autonomy and dignity, and hence the amount of compensation needed to strike 
the balance in taking (for example) commercial property might be different than it would 
be for taking highly personal property, even if both had the same market value.  
However, the social model is only applied sporadically: in many cases, the Court relies 
on legal and economic models of property.  Part II demonstrates that the use of these 
models is not consistent with the integrated theory.   
Part III accepts that the social model may appear unworkable in some situations.  
In practice, the application of the social model would require the Court to re-evaluate the 
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importance of the market standard.  While this would not necessarily require states to pay 
more than the market value, and indeed in some cases it may require less, at the very least 
the Court should not readily assume that payment of market value compensation does 
strike a fair balance.  It may be argued, however, that this would be impractical; perhaps 
the market standard represents the best approximation of the just result for the majority of 
cases.  However, this Part argues that this objection is not insurmountable, and makes 
some suggestions on how the Court might bring its doctrines in line with the integrated 
theory that it espouses.   
Part III is followed by a brief conclusion.   
I. THE RISE OF THE BALANCING PRINCIPLE
The European Convention on Human Rights is a product of the Council of 
Europe.  The Council itself came into being in May 1949, with the signing of the Statute 
of Europe by Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom.7
One of the Council's first tasks was the preparation of a treaty on human rights.  It 
took more time than anticipated, partly due to disagreements over the content of a right to 
property.8 In principle, the states agreed that a right to property should be included in the 
 
7 Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, Europ. T.S. No.1 (in force Aug. 
3, 1949). 
8 See generally TOM ALLEN, PROPERTY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998, 17-28 
(2005); Wolfgang Peukert, Protection of Ownership under Article of the First Protocol to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, 2 HUM. RTS. L.J. 37 (1981); Egon Schwelb, 
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treaty, but every proposal that contained a reference to compensation was rejected, no 
matter how weakly drawn.  Even a prohibition on the "arbitrary confiscation" of property 
was rejected at one point: some governments feared that it would be interpreted as a 
guarantee of compensation.9 Eventually, the states agreed to sign the Convention without 
a right to property, but committed themselves to continue negotiations with a view to its 
incorporation in a later treaty.   
The states that opposed a compensation guarantee were concerned that it might 
compromise plans for ambitious economic and social policies.  For example, the British 
government not only denied that compensation should be required for every taking, but 
also that the international community had a legitimate interest in the content of a member 
 
The Protection of the Right to Property of Nationals under the First Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 518, 533-41 (1964); AW.B. 
SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION, chap. 15 (2001).  
9 Consultative Assembly, Recommendation No. 24 to the Council of Ministers on 
the Draft Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
adopted 25 August 1950, at the conclusion of the Debate on the Report from the 
Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 8
COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES" OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS: RECUEIL DES TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES DE LA CONVENTION 
EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, 192, 194 (1975-85).   
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state's rules on compensation.10 Eventually, the states only concluded negotiations by 
 
10 See generally SIMPSON, supra note 8 (see also Jacob W.F. Sundberg, Human 
Rights in Sweden: The Breakthrough of an Idea, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 951 (1986) on the 
position in Sweden). The travaux préparatoires record that the British Government "did 
not think it possible to express this principle [compensation] in terms which would be 
appropriate to all the various types of case which might arise, nor could it admit that 
decisions taken on this matter by the competent national authorities should be subject to 
revision by international organs." Report of the Committee of Experts, 24 February 1951, 
in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 7 COLLECTED EDITION, supra note 9, 204, 208.  The French and 
Saar delegations joined the British in expressing reservations, even in relation to a 
relatively modest guarantee that expropriation should be subject to "such compensation 
as shall be determined in accordance with the conditions provided for by law."  Meeting 
of the Committee of Experts, 18 April 1951, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 7 COLLECTED 
EDITION, id., 222-24.  They "could not accept a definition of the right to property 
comprising in all cases the principle of compensation in the event of private property 
being acquired by the State."  Id. at 250.  Instead, the British proposed the following for 
the right to property: 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. This provision, however, shall not be considered as infringing in any 
way the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary either to serve 
the ends of justice or to secure the payment of monies due whether by way of 
taxes or otherwise, or to ensure the acquisition or use of property in accordance 
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saying as little as possible about compensation. The relevant part of P1-1 declares that 
"[n]o one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law."  
The cryptic reference to international law meant only that the principles of customary 
international law that require states to compensate aliens for the taking of their property 
would remain in force.11 The reluctance to give P1-1 any real substantive content is even 
more striking in its third sentence.  As worded, a state may do whatever it, and not the 
Court (or any other organs of the Council of Europe), "deems necessary to control the use 
of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or 
other contributions or penalties."  The negotiations had left the right to property without 
any real substantive content, except for the commitment to the rule of law.   
A. P1-1 as a guarantee of the rule of law 
As a guarantee of the rule of law, the focus of P1-1 fell on procedural issues.  
Nevertheless, the wartime experience in continental Europe demonstrated that an 
international guarantee of the procedural aspects of the rule of law was significant in 
 
with the general interest.  Letter addressed on 7th February 1951 by the Secretary-
General to the Foreign Ministers of the Member States, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 7
COLLECTED EDITION, id., 184, 186. 
The absence of any reference to compensation was, of course, quite deliberate.   
11 See generally Hélène Ruiz Fabri, The Approach Taken by the European Court 
of Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for 'Regulatory Expropriations' of 
the Property of Foreign Investors, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 148, 162-163 (2002). 
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itself.12 Moreover, the war crimes trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo would have suggested 
that international tribunals could be given some scope for developing substantive criteria 
of legality and the rule of law. For example, at the domestic level, moves were already 
being made in the Federal Republic of Germany to restore Jewish property seized under 
Nazi 'law' on the basis that the 'law' under which title had been taken should not be 
recognized as such.13 Arguably, the Court could have extended these principles so as to 
treat some uncompensated takings as unlawful.  In such cases, international law would 
dictate that the appropriate remedy would be restitution of the property or its monetary 
equivalent, together with damages.14 Hence, it could have been argued that P1-1 did 
impose substantive obligations on states, even though it only required expropriations to 
be lawful.   
 
12 For example, Mr. Bastid, a French delegate, argued that a right to property was 
a necessary part of a human rights treaty, because individuals had to be protected from 
"arbitrary confiscation, that is to say, from those high-handed administrative or private 
measures of which all the totalitarian regimes have furnished such sinister examples." 
Sitting of the Consultative Assembly, 24-25 August 1950, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 6
COLLECTED EDITION, supra note 9, 72, 76.  
13 For a description, see Robert Alexy, A Defence of Radbruch’s Formula, in 
RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 15 (David Dyzenhaus, ed., 
1999) at 18-19 and Frank Haldemann, Gustav Radbruch vs. Hans Kelsen: A Debate on 
Nazi Law, 18 RATIO JURIS 162 at 175 (2005). 
14 See Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, 260-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
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To a very limited extent, the Court has developed the idea of legality with a view 
to its substantive content.  P1-1 requires deprivations to be "subject to the conditions 
provided for by law", and the Court has taken this beyond formal compliance with the 
rules of the domestic legal system.  Lawfulness incorporates criteria reflecting the 
"quality of law", by which an interference with property that complies with domestic 
legal rules may still breach P1-1 if the rules are not sufficiently "accessible, precise and 
foreseeable."15 Nevertheless, it was always doubtful that these criteria could be extended 
to create a general duty to compensate for takings.  Ultimately, the argument was rejected 
in James v. United Kingdom.16 Instead, standards of lawfulness have focused on the pace 
and manner of legal change, especially in relation to the quality of the democratic 
process.  There were hints of this in James, as the Court noted that the legislation in 
question had been debated extensively in Parliament.17 Perhaps the Court would have 
scrutinized it with more care if the legislation had amounted a sudden, unexpected 
 
15 Carbonara and Ventura v. Italy, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 91 at 107; Beyeler v. 
Italy, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 at 88 (G.C.); Hentrich v. France, 296-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A), 19-20 (1994); Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 47 (1986); Belvedere Alberghiera 
srl v. Italy, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 135. See generally, Helen Mountfield, The Concept of 
an Unlawful Interference with Fundamental Rights, in JEFFREY JOWELL & JONATHON  
COOPER, eds., UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES (2001). 
16 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 40-41 (1986). 
17 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32-34; see also Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
at 13-16. 
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development in the law, especially if it had been pursued in a way that minimized 
democratic debate.  In other words, where the Court has confidence in the state's 
democratic processes, it is content to allow issues regarding the substantive justice of 
property laws to be resolved by those processes. 
B. The rejection of the rule-of-law model and the adoption of the integrated 
theory  
The narrow focus on the rule of law was not seriously challenged until 1982, in 
the landmark case of Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden.18 The Court stated that, to 
determine whether an interference with property complied with P1-1, it was necessary to 
"determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general interest 
of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental 
rights."19 It was not enough to say that the interference satisfied the limited criteria of the 
rule of law. 
This remains the case.  The rule of law is plainly important; indeed, the Court has 
said that "one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society", "inherent in all the 
Articles of the Convention", and that "the first and most important requirement of Article 
1 of Protocol No 1 is that any interference by a public authority with the peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions should be lawful".20 However, the requirement is easily 
 
18 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982). 
19 Id., at 29. 
20 Iatridis, 1999-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 97. 
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satisfied in the vast majority of cases, and the real issue is whether the interference strikes 
a fair balance between community and individual interests.   
(i)  The source of the fair balance test 
It is worth emphasizing that the source of the fair balance test lies outside the text 
of P1-1 itself.  There is no mention of a "fair balance" in P1-1 itself.  However, the Court 
stated that "[t]he search for this balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention and is 
also reflected in the structure of Article 1 (P1-1)".21
The second of these claims–that the "structure" of P1-1 provides a basis for the 
fair balance test–is very weak, but it leads us back to the claim that the balance is 
"inherent in the whole of the Convention".  On its face, the structure of P1-1 is quite 
simple: it states a right in generous terms in the first sentence, and allows two broad 
limitations in the remaining sentences.  The threshold issue in a specific case is whether 
there has been some interference with the "enjoyment of possessions".  If so, P1-1 is 
applicable, and the analysis shifts to the limitations in the second and third sentences.  
The language of P1-1 suggests that, if the interference does fall within either one of the 
two limitations, there can be no violation.  As the limitations were deliberately drawn 
very broadly, the intended effect was to minimize the impact of P1-1 on state powers 
over property.  Put differently, the original conception of P1-1 did embody a balance 
between community and private interests, as neither the state nor the owner held an 
absolute power over property.  However, if the conditions of the second and third 
sentences were satisfied, the balance had been struck without any need for the Court to 
 
21 Id. 
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assess the fairness of the interference.  States were the sole judge as to the necessity for 
the interference, and the Court would only have the power to judge whether the 
interference complied with the rule of law.22 
Plainly, the Court rejected this reading of P1-1 in Sporrong, but equally important 
was its reliance on Convention principles as the source of the standards of substantive 
justice that would apply to property.  This followed from its reconstruction of the scope 
of each of three sentences of P1-1.  The second sentence was narrowly restricted to the 
appropriation of full ownership: the taking of some interest short of ownership was 
excluded.  The third sentence covered regulatory controls and taxation (and their 
enforcement), but seemed to exclude the appropriation for other purposes.  Everything 
else fell into a residual category, not governed by the limitations of the second or third 
sentence, but only by the general principles of the first sentence.  But since the first 
sentence appears to prohibit all interferences with property that do not fall under the 
second or third sentences, it may have seemed that the Court had dramatically extended 
the protection provided by P1-1.  This was not the intention: indeed, there is nothing 
about the residual category that warrants higher scrutiny.  For example, Sporrong 
concerned steps taken in preparation for an expropriation.  Other cases under the first 
 
22 For a pre-Sporrong example of this position, see Handyside v. United 
Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976), where the Court stated that the states were the 
sole judges of the necessity of measures taken to enforce regulatory controls on the use of 
property, even if confiscation was the result.   
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sentence include appropriations of intangible property23 or interests in tangible property 
other than full ownership,24 and generally anything that is not clearly an outright 
expropriation or a regulatory control over property.25 Plainly, P1-1 was not intended to 
treat all such residual cases as breaches of the right to property.  Hence, the structure of 
P1-1 as developed in Sporrong does require some kind of implied limitation on the right 
to property, and the Court found this implied limitation in the general principle of 
proportionality, rather than ideas of substantive justice derived from the rule of law.     
At this point, having decided that this residual category did exist, and that it was 
not restricted by the express limitations of the second and third sentences, the Court was 
able to turn to one of its first judgments in support of the fair balance test.  In Certain 
Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium ('Belgian 
Linguistics Case'),26 the Court remarked that the Convention "implies a just balance 
 
23 E.g. BrumTrescu v Romania, 1999-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 201 (cancellation of a state 
debt); Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece, 301-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) (cancellation 
of an arbitration award against the state); cf. Pressos Compania Naviera SA v. Belgium, 
332 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996) (extinction of tort claims).  
24 E.g. Iatridis v. Greece, 1999-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 75 (taking of a leasehold interest); 
Bramelid and Malmström v. Sweden, Appl. No. 8588/79, 8589/79 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. 
Oct. 12, 1982) (compulsory buy-out of company shares); cf. Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) (nationalization of company shares).   
25 See, ALLEN, supra note 8, 107-12.   
26 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1968). 
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between the protection of the general interest of the Community and the respect due to 
fundamental human rights while attaching particular importance to the latter."27 This case 
dealt with Article 14, which, like P1-1, does not include the 'necessity in a democratic 
society' formula.  On its face, Article 14 is an absolute right, as it states simply that  
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status. 
Hence, the Court found it necessary to develop some basis for determining when laws 
provide differential treatment violate the Article 14.  The idea of balancing was adopted.  
As put by the Court,  
Article 14 (art. 14) does not prohibit distinctions in treatment which are founded 
on an objective assessment of essentially different factual circumstances and 
which, being based on the public interest strike a fair balance between the 
protection of the interests of the community and respect for the rights and 
freedoms safeguarded by the Convention."28 
The same implied limitation was therefore applied in Sporrong, to deal with the 
'discovery' of the residual category of interferences with property.   
It was not at all obvious that the "whole of the Convention" would provide a 
source for interpreting the substantive content of P1-1.  There were other potential 
 
27 Id. at para. 5.  
28 Id. at para. 7; emphasis added. 
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sources of principle: in particular, the Court might have relied upon comparative law to 
identify common principles relating to state powers over property.  In other words, 
instead of looking for guidance to other Convention rights, it might have looked outside 
the Convention, to rights to property in other contexts.  In national law, it might have 
looked to constitutional bills of rights and the protection of property.  In international 
law, other human rights treaties or possibly investment and economic treaties might have 
provided another source for determining a state's obligations to property owners.  The 
Sporrong approach reflects the theory that the Convention and Protocol represent an 
integrated, coherent code relating not only to the procedure for protection rights, but also 
to their content.   
This theory goes back to a crucial preliminary decision regarding the form of the 
proposed human rights treaty.  Some countries argued for a treaty that simply enumerated 
rights, without elaboration, so that their content could be determined by subsequent 
interpretation.  However, other countries were not at all confident that the Council of 
Europe, and its proposed court of human rights, should have the power to develop rights 
in this way.  Instead, they argued that the rights should be enumerated and defined as 
precisely as possible.29 Ultimately, the Committee of Experts, appointed by the 
 
29 Report to the Committee of Ministers Submitted by the Committee of Experts 
Instructued to Draw Up a Draft Convention of Collective Guarantee of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 4 COLLECTED EDITION, supra note 
9, 1. France, Ireland, Italy and Turkey supported enumeration; the United Kingdom, 
Greece, Norway, and the Netherlands supported precise definition; the other states were 
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Committee of Ministers, "rejected the method of general statement, and adopted the 
system of precise definition to the greatest extent possible of the specific rights to be 
secured."30 
If, as seems likely, a sparse text would have encouraged the Court to search for 
common principles, the 'method of general statement' would have supported the 
integrated view of Convention rights from its inception. Conversely, the 'system of 
precise definition', if properly executed, would have suggested that the rights do not 
necessarily form a coherent whole, or at least that the interpretation of specific rights 
would not draw upon implicit principles of general application.  Instead, the detailed text 
of each right would disclose its own principles for interpretation.  If subsequent 
developments proved that there were gaps in the protection of rights, the member states 
could act through the Council's legislative organs; new protocols could be added to the 
Convention, or new treaties could be agreed.  Indeed, to some extent, this has happened: 
since the Convention was adopted, additional protocols have recognized a number of new 
 
equivocal. See generally, SIMPSON, supra note 8, at 370-71, 687-88, 692-93, 705-707, 
713-17 and Sundberg, supra note 10, at 956-57. 
30 Memorandum and Letters from the Secretariat-General, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 8
COLLECTED EDITION, supra note 9, 126, 126-128 (although elsewhere the travaux 
préparatoires suggest that the final product was also seen as a compromise: Report of the 
Conference of Senior Officials, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 4 COLLECTED EDITION, id., 242,
248). 
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rights (including the right to property)31 and there have been a number of new 
conventions on different aspects of individual rights.32 Nevertheless, the vagueness of 
 
31 In addition to P1-1, see: Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952,  Europ. T.S. No. 9 (in force 
May 18, 1954), Article 2 (right to education) and Article 3 (right to free elections); 
Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, securing certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in the 
Convention and in the first Protocol thereto, Sept. 16, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 046 (in force 
May 2, 1968), Article 1 (prohibition of imprisonment for debt), Article 2 (freedom of 
movement), Article 3 (prohibition of expulsion of nationals), and Article 4 (prohibition of 
collective expulsion of aliens); Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114 (in force March 1, 1985), Article 1 (abolition 
of the death penalty), Article 2 (death penalty in time of war); Protocol No. 7 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 22, 
1984, Europ. T.S. No. 117 (in force Nov. 1, 1988), Article 1 (procedural safeguards 
relating to expulsion of aliens), Article 2 (right of appeal in criminal matters), Article 3 
(compensation for wrongful conviction), Article 4 (right not to be tried or punished 
twice), Article 5 (equality between spouses); Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 2000, Europ. T.S. No. 
177 (in force April 1, 2005), Article 1 (general prohibition of discrimination); and 
Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
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the language of P1-1 suggests that the 'system of precise definition' was not fully 
achieved, as the Sporrong derivation of the fair balance test from the "whole of the 
Convention" demonstrates.   
(ii) Compensation and the fair balance 
The specific issue of compensation was also broached in Sporrong, as the Court 
linked it to the fair balance test.  The case concerned the issue of permits that authorized 
the expropriation of the applicants' land.  The applicants remained entitled to occupy, rent 
and sell their land, although there were some restrictions on its development and its 
market value declined.  It was the duration of the permits that concerned the Court: in 
some cases, they were in place for over twenty years.  This upset the fair balance between 
"the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual's fundamental rights".  However, the balance could have been 
maintained if the applicants had been given "the possibility of seeking a reduction of the 
 
Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, May 3, 
2002, Europ. T.S. No. 187 (in force July 1, 2003), Article 1 (abolition of the death 
penalty in all circumstances). 
32 See, e.g., European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 035 (in force 
Feb. 26, 1965); European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance, Dec. 11, 1953, 
Europ. T.S. No. 014 (in force July 1, 1954); Convention for the protection of Human 
Rights and dignity of the human being with regard to the application of biology and 
medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, Europ. T.S. No. 
164 (in force Dec. 1, 1999). 
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time-limits or of claiming compensation."33 Compensation was relevant to the fair 
balance, although the Court fell short of saying that there was a right to compensation.   
The Court took the next step in James34 and applied the fair balance to 
deprivations of property under the second sentence of P1-1.  It stated that "compensation 
terms are material to the assessment whether a fair balance has been struck between the 
various interests at stake and, notably, whether or not a disproportionate burden has been 
imposed on the person who has been deprived of his possessions."35 Accordingly, the 
"taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value would 
normally constitute a disproportionate interference which could not be considered 
justifiable".36 
The duty to compensate was plainly very weak, as it only required payment of an 
amount "reasonably related" to the value of the property.  Even so, it did not apply in 
every case.  In James, the Court stated that the fair balance might be struck without 
providing full compensation, depending on the circumstances.  As a matter of general 
principle, it accepted that compensation should be related to the value of the property, but 
declared that:   
 
33 Sporrong, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (emphasis added).  
34 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).   
35 James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36; Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 
50. 
36 James, id.; Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 50-51;  
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Legitimate objectives of "public interest", such as pursued in measures of 
economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call 
for less than reimbursement of the full market value.37 
37 James, id. at 36. A similar statement appears in Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) at 51, in relation to the nationalization of the aircraft and shipbuilding industries in 
Britain, and it is often cited by the Court with James in support of the principle in the 
passage quoted in the text.  However, the reasoning in Lithgow concentrates on the 
method of valuation rather than the standard of compensation. Compensation for shares 
in companies whose shares did not trade on the Stock Exchange was determined on the 
basis of the "hypothetical share price model", which was based primarily on price-
earnings ratios of listed companies.  The shareholders argued that this was unfair and 
artificial because it excluded the consideration of the value of the underlying assets of the 
company, among other things. However, the Court held that the hypothetical share price 
model did produce a valuation that was "reasonably related" to the value of the target 
companies, and hence it implicitly decided that there had been no departure from the 
ordinary standard.  This conclusion may be doubted: for example, in many cases the 
amount of compensation fell short of the company's cash reserves.  Nevertheless, the 
Court's reasoning suggests that the public interest in economic restructuring was given 
weight only in relation to the choice of valuation method.  See generally Maurice 
Mendelson, "The United Kingdom Nationalization Cases and the European Convention 
on Human Rights" (1986) 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 33.
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For reasons discussed in more detail in Part II, the Court held that social justice allowed a 
redistribution of title from landlords to tenants at a price that fell below full market value 
of the landlords' interests.     
The Court has also made it clear that the states would be given a wide "margin of 
appreciation" in determining the level of compensation, as it stated that "it will respect 
the legislature's judgment in this connection unless that judgment was manifestly without 
reasonable foundation."38 Nevertheless, James does impose a duty on states, and it is 
significant that it was derived from Convention principles of fairness and proportionality 
rather than a substantive theory of the rule of law, or from a comparative analysis of 
national or international law.     
The integrated theory of Sporrong opens up other points for consideration.  As 
explained below, it suggests that the Court should identify the interests protected by P1-1 
 
38 Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 51.  The doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation recognizes that the Convention was not intended to impose uniformity on 
the member states.  The Convention system is based on the principle of subsidiarity, 
under which states have primary responsibility for ensuring that human rights are 
protected within their jurisdiction (see especially Articles 1 and 13).  Hence, the margin 
of appreciation allows national governments some discretion in determining policies and 
weighing competing interests in a way that is compatible with the protection of 
Convention rights.  In cases such as Lithgow, id., and James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 
the recognition of a wide margin of appreciation has the practical effect of watering down 
the compensation standard even further.    
Compensation and Property – Page 25 
in a manner that reflects the "whole of the Convention". Other Convention rights are 
interpreted with the liberal values such as individual autonomy, dignity and security in 
mind; indeed, it has been said that the "essence" of Convention rights is "respect for 
human dignity and human freedom".39 If the Sporrong argument in favor of the 
integrated view is carried through to its logical conclusion, these values should also 
influence the interpretation of P1-1.40 Accordingly, the Court should take the role served 
by the property in securing the individual's autonomy and dignity into account under the 
fair balance test.  The amount of compensation needed to strike the balance would 
depend on the social function of the property in question.   
C. Comparative legal method and compensation  
General Convention principles of fairness and proportionality were not the only 
possible source for a duty to compensate.  Other textual elements of the Convention that 
might have provided an alternative source, although they would have led the inquiry in 
the direction of the comparative theory. 
39 Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] 2 A.C. 557, 605 (H.L.) (Baroness Hale), 
referring to Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 193. 
40 For example, one eminent jurist has said that property fits into the Convention 
scheme of human rights because "freedom as enshrined in the Convention cannot subsist 
without a meaningful protection of private property."  J.A. Frowein, "The Protection of 
Property" in The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (R. St. J. 
Macdonald, F. Matscher and H. Petzold, eds., 1993), 515.   
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In one of its first decisions, the Consultative Assembly called on the member 
States, acting through the Committee of Ministers,41 to draw up a treaty that would 
"maintain intact the human rights and fundamental freedoms assured by the constitutions, 
laws, and administrative practices actually existing in the respective countries at the date 
of the signature of the convention."42 This suggests that the common standards of the 
member states would define the content of the Convention rights.  Arguably, this method 
would not have required the Court to engage in its own evaluation of the fairness or 
justice of a taking of property, but only to determine whether most states would have 
required compensation in similar circumstances.  As such, P1-1 would have provided 
further security for property as defined by national law, but no more than that.  Moreover, 
the compensation rules of P1-1 would be limited to those were normally applied in the 
member states. 
This argument was raised and rejected in James. The Court acknowledged that 
rules on compensation could be found in the national laws of the member states, and that 
these might provide some guidance on the application of the fair balance.  Nevertheless, 
the Court did not rely on comparative law to develop the principles of compensation that 
 
41 The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (now the Parliamentary 
Assembly) comprises delegates appointed by each state; it makes recommendations to the 
Committee of Ministers, but the primary decision-making power is reserved to the 
Ministers.   
42 First Session of the Consultative Assembly Held at Strabourg 10 August to 8 
September 1949, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 1 COLLECTED EDITION, supra note 9, 28, 36.   
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apply under P1-1.43 Moreover, the fair balance test has led the Court beyond the 
minimum common standards, since it applies to all forms of interference, including 
regulatory measures, taxes, contributions, penalties, and anything else that falls under the 
third sentence of P1-1.  For example, in Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, the Court held that 
Poland breached P1-1 because its rent control legislation prevented landlords from 
enjoying "their entitlement to derive profit from their property".44 Similarly, in Azinas v. 
Cyprus, the withdrawal of a civil service pension as a penalty for criminal fraud was 
found to breach P1-1 because it was too harsh.45 And, in Chassagnou v. France, the 
Court held that P1-1 was violated by laws that required landowners who had strong 
 
43 James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36; see also Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) at 50 ("Like the Commission, the Court observes that under the legal systems of the 
Contracting States, the taking of property in the public interest without payment of 
compensation is treated as justifiable only in exceptional circumstances not relevant for 
present purposes.") 
44 Appl. No. 35014/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 19, 2006) (Grand Chamber), para. 239. 
(Judge ZupanWiW, in a partly dissenting judgment, asked "How can that be a landlord’s 
human right?", but subsequent cases indicate that the Court accepts that it is: see Ghigo v. 
Malta, Appl. No. 31122/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 26, 2006), para. 66 and Fleri Soler and 
Camilleri v. Malta, Appl. No. 35349/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 26, 2006), para. 74) 
45 Appl. No. 56679/00, (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 20, 2002) (Third Section), (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. May 28, 2004 (Grand Chamber) (the Grand Chamber reversed on other grounds).  
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ethical objections to hunting to make their land available for it.46 The idea that every 
kind of interference with property may be subject to review on substantive grounds was 
not a common principle of national or international law when P1-1 was drafted and had 
not become a common principle when Sporrong was decided.47 
The comparative legal method is therefore consistent with Sporrong in the belief 
the rule of law does not exhaust the substantive content of P1-1.  However, it diverges 
from Sporrong in two important ways.  The first, as explained above, is its identification 
of the source of these substantive principles.  It is a conservative theory, in the sense that 
it draws general principles from the existing body of national laws.48 Unlike the 
integrated theory, it does not accept that the values and content of international human 
rights stand apart from national law.  In this respect, the comparative legal method and 
the integrated theory work from diametrically opposed positions.   
The second concerns the role of the Court itself in developing standards.  The 
adoption of the fair balance creates uncertainty that is bound to invite litigation.  It 
therefore highlights the Court's own role in developing standards of fairness regarding the 
use of state power over property.  Indirectly, the uncertainty of the test empowers the 
 
46 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 21. 
47 See the joint dissenting opinion in Sporrong, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), of Mr. 
Zekia, Mr. Cremona, Mr. Thór Vilhjálmsson, Mr. Lagergren, Sir Vincent Evans, Mr. 
Macdonald, Mr. Bernhardt and Mr. Gersing. 
48 Except in the cases involving the expropriation of alien property, to which 
general principles of international law apply (under the second sentence of P1-1).   
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Court.  Indeed, this was recognized by the states that preferred enumeration over precise 
definition, but it seems that the political climate was not ready for a more activist court 
(in relation to property) until Sporrong.
This reflects patterns that should be recognizable to American legal scholars.  
Indeed, the fair balance test was adopted only four years after the Supreme Court stated, 
in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, that an ad hoc balancing test should 
determine whether regulatory controls on the use of property are compensatable takings 
under the Fifth Amendment.49 Plainly, we cannot take the comparison too far: Penn 
Central concerned the narrower question of compensation for regulatory takings, whereas 
Sporrong concerned the basis of substantive justice in property matters as a whole.  For 
example, in Penn Central, there was no doubt over the availability of compensation for 
an outright expropriation or the standard of compensation that should apply in such cases.  
Sporrong did not even settle the compensation standard: it merely signalled that it would 
need to be addressed in later cases.  Moreover, Penn Central itself represented an 
elaboration of a theme set down as earlier as 1922, in the famous statement of Justice 
Holmes that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too 
far it will be recognized as a taking."50 Sporrong represented a more radical break with 
the past.  Nevertheless, the decision to base compensatability on broad principles and 
standards rather than specific rules is similar to both.   
 
49 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
50 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415. 
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The uncertainty inherent in balancing tests also produced a similar sense of 
unease in both systems.  In the United States, the approach to regulatory takings is often 
criticized; as Marc R. Poirer put it, "[i]n judicial opinion and academic assessment alike, 
it seems almost de rigueur to include at least one or two choice sentences of complaint, 
before going about whatever business the opinion or article seeks to accomplish."51 The 
Supreme Court later supplemented the Penn Central balancing test with a variety of rules 
intended to provide some further guidance. In Loretto v. Teleprompter, it held that 
compensation should be payable on a physical occupation of tangible property;52 in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, it held that compensation should follow regulations 
that deprive the owner of all economically viable use of the land (unless the use would 
constitute a nuisance under common law).53 Like the Supreme Court, the Court of 
Human Rights also attempted to develop supplementary doctrines relating to substantive 
review.  The market value rule itself represents one such attempt.  Hutten-Czapska hints 
at a test similar to that of Lucas, as it suggests that compensation should be paid to an 
owner denied the possibility of earning a profit from their property.54 At least in part, the 
courts in both jurisdictions seem to search for precision and formalism in the belief that it 
provides an appropriate distance between their judicial functions and the political 
 
51 Marc R. Poirer, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 93, 97 (2002); see id. 97-129 for a full review.   
52 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
53 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
54 Appl. No. 35014/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 19, 2006). 
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functions of other decision-makers. It is in this regard that the comparative legal method 
proved attractive to some members of the Court of Human Rights, as the comparative 
method gives an appearance of neutrality and certainty in cases involving difficult 
judgements on social and political policy.  The comparative method limits Court's role in 
developing substantive doctrine to the identification of national trends relating to state 
power over property.  It falls to national lawmakers to determine whether social and 
economic conditions require a change in the principles regarding the expropriation and 
regulation of property: the Court merely observes whether a consensus has developed 
amongst the member states.  It follows social developments without prescribing them.    
But, even if it could be argued that formalism can remove a tribunal from the 
setting of social policy or that it can produce greater predictability, in the European 
context it should be clear that the Court of Human Rights must exercise judgment in 
determining whether a consensus has emerged or that it ought to be applied to all member 
states or to the specific facts of the case at hand.  Moreover, it should not be too 
surprising to American lawyers that the Court is inconsistent and unpredictable in its use 
of common standards.  For instance, in Stec v. United Kingdom, the Court held that 
treating men and women differently in relation to retirement ages and benefits did not 
violate the Article 14 right to freedom from discrimination, because there were no 
common standards in the member states on these issues.55 On the face of it, the Court 
avoided potential political controversy by leaving this issue to the member states.  On the 
other hand, in Marckx v. Belgium, where the Court decided that discrimination in 
 
55 Appl. Nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 12, 2006) (G.C.).   
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succession based on legitimacy of birth did violate freedom from discrimination, it 
acknowledged that there was no consensus on legitimacy and succession but felt it ought 
to take the lead in setting an international standard.56 Similarly, in the cases mentioned 
above–Hutten-Czapska, Azinas, and Chassagnou–the Court did not wait for a consensus 
to emerge in the member states before setting its own standards. The cases involved 
difficult questions of social policy, on which there was no clear consensus in the member 
states, and yet the Court felt confident that it could impose its views on the states.   
 
56 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979); see generally George Letsas, The Truth in 
Autonomous Concepts: How to Interpret the ECHR, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 279, 299-301 
(2004), who points out that the Court identified a lack of consensus, and seemed to regard 
it as an opportunity to act. That is, discrimination between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' 
children in matters of property and succession was the norm when the Convention came 
into force at a time.  While some states had reversed the former position, many had not.  
There were international conventions that called for a reversal of discriminatory laws, 
such as the European Convention on the Legal Status of Children born out of Wedlock, 
Oct. 15, 1975, Europ. T.S. No. 085 (in force Aug. 11, 1978), but they had been ratified by 
only a minority of the member states of the Council of Europe. Marckx, id. at 10-11, 19-
20.  However, the Court declared that these developments established "a clear measure of 
common ground in this area amongst modern societies" and the fact that the new 
developments only commanded support from a minority of states should not be taken as a 
"refusal to admit equality between 'illegitimate' and 'legitimate' children on the point 
under consideration." Id. at 19. 
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The Sporrong judgment therefore has several dimensions beyond the call for 
substantive justice.  The adoption of the fair balance test put faith in the Convention as 
the source of general principles.  In addition, it also suggested that the Court preferred to 
work with standards rather than narrow rules, and with this went an implicit toleration of 
legal uncertainty and for its acceptance of a role in setting standards for the member 
states. Sporrong may give the impression that the Court resolved these issues, but in fact, 
the position remains unsettled.  As the next section explains, these unresolved tensions, 
particularly in relation to the full implications of the integrated theory, have driven the 
judicial analysis of compensation. 
II. THE FAIR BALANCE AND PROPERTY CONCEPTIONS
In simple terms, the fair balance test may be satisfied in one of two ways: either 
the victim receives offsetting benefits that reduce the impact of the interference to a 
modest level, or the public interest served by the interference is so compelling that even a 
severe impact is justified.  Compensation is directed to the first possibility, as it reduces 
the impact on the victim by providing money as a substitute for the property.  Of course, 
this works only where money is a substitute for what is lost, and whether it is a substitute 
depends on how the Court regards the interests that P1-1 protects.   
The case law reveals that the Court applies three different conceptions of the P1-1 
interest, which this Article describes as the legal, economic and social models. Briefly, 
the legal model conceives of the human rights interest in property in terms of the existing 
law of the relevant member state.  As explained below, it does not fit with the integrated 
theory of P1-1 and the Convention, but rather with the comparative theory.  The 
economic and the social models concentrate on the social function of property, although 
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the focus is different.  The economic model focuses on the objective value of the 
property; in most cases, the Court assumes that this is the market value.57 While the 
 
57 It is worth noting, however, that the Court has never subjected its conception of 
"value" to a close examination, although it is reasonably clear that it believes that 
"value", "full value", "market value" and "full market value" are synonymous. The terms 
were used interchangeably in James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36 and Lithgow, 102
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 51. In Pincová and Pinc v. Czech Republic, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 311, 329, and Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 35 (1995) 
the Court assumed that the James/Lithgow formula required "market value".   In 
Scordino, Appl. No. 36813/97, however, the Italian government seemed to assume that 
market value was subjective: at para. 90, it is recorded as arguing that "the 'market value' 
of property was a vague and uncertain concept, which depended on a great many 
variables and was essentially subjective: it could for example be influenced by the 
financial circumstances of the vendor or a particularly strong interest on the part of the 
purchaser."  For this reason, Italy claimed that paying compensation at about half the rate 
of the objectively-determined market value did not violate the fair balance.  The Court 
rejected this argument, with little discussion.  In any case, if domestic law requires 
"market value" compensation, the Court is unlikely to question whether the valuation 
assumptions and methods do in fact produce the market value.  In practice, the Court is 
unlikely to find a breach based on the choice of valuation methods, unless it appears that 
the methods relied on assumptions that are inconsistent.  For example, a series of cases 
dealt with Greek rules that allowed the expropriating authority to reduce compensation by 
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Court takes the view that it is compatible with the integrated view, it will be shown that it 
is actually closer to the legal model in its orientation.  Finally, the social model reflects 
the integrated view, as it seeks to identify the values of individual autonomy, dignity and 
equality that underpin other Convention rights, but as they relate to access and control 
over resources.  By examining how the Court employs these models of property, we can 
test whether it applies the fair balance test in the manner that the integrated theory should 
require. 
A. The legal model of property  
The legal model is derived from two ideas.  The first is the comparative method 
and the importance of the common standards of the member states.  Since the member 
states generally do require compensation for expropriation, the comparative method 
could have provided an alternative basis for a compensation guarantee.  It would not have 
relied on the fair balance test, or on proof that money can act as a substitute for property.  
Of course, it may be the case that compensation rules of a given state are indeed derived 
at least partly from a sense of fairness, and from a theory of the commensurability of 
 
offsetting benefits; while the Court accepted that this in principle, it found a breach 
because the calculation of the offsetting benefits relied on irrebuttable presumptions.  The 
Court said that it was unfair not to allow the owners an opportunity to demonstrate that 
there was no actual benefit. Katikaridis v. Greece, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1673; Tsomtsos 
and Others v. Greece, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1699; Papachelas v. Greece, 1999-II Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 1; Efstathiou and Michaïlidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 79. 
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money and property, but that is really beside the point.  As long as a practice of 
compensating for property can be established, P1-1 would prevent states from departing 
from that practice. 
The second is the liberal idea of rights, as the legal model regards property as a 
protected area of individual autonomy. Of course, the state's power to expropriate in the 
public interest is recognized, but even so, there is an entitlement to compensation.  
Superficially, it has links with the integrated theory, because the liberal focus on 
autonomy and dignity is common to all Convention rights.  However, as Laura 
Underkuffler argues, a liberal/legalist conception of property puts private interests in 
opposition to collective power and the public interest.58 "Collective forces, under this 
 
58 LAURA UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 
(2003). Underkuffler describes the 'common' and 'operative' conceptions of property.  
These correspond to the legal and social models of property discussed in this Article.   
For discussions exploring similar ideas, in the American context, see GREGORY S. 
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY — COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN 
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 (1997); Gregory S. Alexander, Property as 
Propriety, 77 NEB. L. REV. (1999); William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38
UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property,
40 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1988). In relation to other jurisdictions, see Gregory S. Alexander, 
Constitutionalizing Property: Two Experiences, Two Dilemmas, in PROPERTY AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (Janet McLean, ed., 1999), 108; André van der Walt, Property Theory and 
the Transformation of Property Law, in MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW (Elizabeth 
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conception, are clearly external to the protection that property, as an entity, affords."59 
Moreover, it assumes equal stringency for all rights of property, in the sense that all are 
equally worthy of protection against collective power.60 This is what distinguishes it 
from the conceptual framework of the integrated view, as it holds that the content of 
property can be determined without reference to the social context: the possibility that 
collective interests exert pressure for a re-drawing of the boundaries of individual 
autonomy does not mean that those boundaries are defined by collective interests.   
The reasoning in Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece demonstrates this position.61 
The Greek government claimed that an arbitration award relating to a contract negotiated 
with the former military government could be extinguished without compensation, partly 
because there were suspicions regarding the relationship between the applicant and the 
military government.62 The Court dismissed these arguments.  Full compensation was 
 
Cooke, ed., 2005), 361; Kevin Gray, Equitable Property, 47 (2) CURRENT LEGAL 
PROBLEMS 157 (1994); Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Private Property and Public 
Propriety, in PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (Janet McLean, ed., 1999), 11. 
59 Id. at 40. 
60 Id. 
61 301-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).   
62 Id. at 87. (Greece claimed that the"laws were part of a body of measures 
designed to cleanse public life of the disrepute attaching to the military regime and to 
proclaim the power and the will of the Greek people to defend the democratic 
institutions".) 
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required because "according to the case-law of international courts and of arbitration 
tribunals any State has a sovereign power to amend or even terminate a contract 
concluded with private individuals, provided it pays compensation".63 This was the key 
principle, and it is significant that its source was found in international law.  While the 
Court stated that this principle "takes account of the need to preserve a fair balance in a 
contractual relationship",64 it was the Court's discovery of the principle in international 
law that was conclusive, rather than the outcome of any balancing process of its own.65 
Indeed, the government's argument that the balance should be struck differently in a case 
where there were suspicions of wrongdoing was dismissed with the simple statement that 
"[i]t would be unjust if every legal relationship entered into with a dictatorial regime was 
regarded as invalid when the regime came to an end."66 By stating this in terms of a 
blanket rule, without reference to the specific circumstances of Stran Greek, the Court 
effectively ruled out the possibility that the weight of public interest may vary from case 
 
63 Id.; emphasis added. 
64 Id..
65 The view of 'possessions' was also highly legalistic, as the Court held that the 
arbitration award constituted property simply because it constituted a "debt in their [the 
applicants'] favour that was sufficiently established to be enforceable".  Id. at 84. 
66 Id. at 87.  But equally important was the inconsistent conduct of the Greek 
government after the fall of the military regime: it had required the applicant to enter 
arbitration and then, when the award was given in favor of the applicant, it sought to 
extinguish it. 
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to case. Ultimately, the analysis of the Court did not focus on the balancing of interests, 
but on the existing principles of international law.   
A further indication of the Court's views on the property model can be seen in 
cases on the applicability of P1-1.  P1-1 is applicable only if there has been an 
interference with the "peaceful enjoyment of possessions".  This, in turn, depends on 
whether the conception of "possessions" reflects the criteria of the social, legal or 
economic model. To be sure, the choice of model often makes no real difference to 
applicability.  For example, with a clear expropriation, it matters not whether the property 
interest is described in terms of the legal, economic or social model: with all three, it is 
obvious that P1-1 does apply.  With marginal cases, however, the legal model would 
limit P1-1 to cases where national law recognizes that the applicant holds a property 
interest. 
As the Court has stated that P1-1 only applies to existing rights of property, rather 
than rights to acquire property, it may appear that it has adopted the legal model.67 
However, an important line of cases suggest that the Sporrong approach also applies to 
issues regarding the scope of P1-1.  In Gasus Dosier-Und Fördertechnik GmbH v. 
Netherlands, the Court stated that:   
"possessions" . . . has an autonomous meaning which is certainly not limited to 
ownership of physical goods: certain other rights and interests constituting assets 
 
67 See, e.g., Marckx, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979); Inze v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) (1988). 
Compensation and Property – Page 40 
can also be regarded as "property rights", and thus as "possessions", for the 
purposes of this provision P1-1.68 
At first glance, the reference to an "autonomous" meaning suggests that the Court 
intended to take P1-1 beyond the strict legal model. Indeed, the doctrine seems to give 
the Court room to formulate its own principles for distinguishing between proprietary and 
personal rights.  It could, for example, identify a core human rights interest to P1-1 
possessions, with a view to the differences in the protection of proprietary and personal 
rights under the Convention and P1-1.  It might note, for example, that the adoption of 
the fair balance test means that property interests receive substantive protection under P1-
 
68 306-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 46 (1995).  The doctrine of the autonomous 
meaning first appeared in relation to the interpretation of "civil rights" and "criminal 
charge" under the Article 6 guarantees of a fair trial: see, e.g., König v. Germany (No 1), 
27 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976) and Öztürk v. Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984); 
see generally Letsas, supra note 56. In James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31, the Court 
stated that the phrase "in the public interest", in the second sentence of P1-1, has an 
autonomous meaning. There are several cases pre-dating Gasus in which the Court did 
not say explicitly that it applied an autonomous meaning of possessions, but the 
judgments are only explicable if it did, because the interests in question were not treated 
as property in the relevant national systems; see Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, 159
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 21 (1991) and Van Marle v. Netherlands, 101 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A). 
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1, but personal rights only receive procedural protection under other Convention rights.69 
From this, it could use the autonomous meaning doctrine to identify those interests that 
are sufficiently important to warrant substantive protection.   
It has followed this approach in cases on social welfare benefits and conditions on 
entitlement based on gender or nationality.  While Article 14 of the Convention 
guarantees freedom from discrimination, it applies only to discrimination in respect of the 
"enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention".70 While this 
includes the right to property under P1-1, it does not provide a free-standing right to 
freedom from discrimination.71 Hence, Article 14 only applies to conditions on social 
welfare if the benefits qualify as "possessions" under P1-1.  In cases that do not concern 
social welfare benefits, the Court has generally said that only rights that have fully vested 
 
69 E.g. Article 6 (fair trial) and Article 8 (right to respect for the home, privacy, 
and correspondence). 
70 Article 14 provides that "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status." 
71 This is now provided by Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 2000, Europ. T.S. No. 177 (in force 
April 1, 2005), Article 1 (general prohibition of discrimination), but as of October 25, 
2006, only fourteen states have ratified it; in the remaining states, it is necessary to rely 
on Article 14 to challenge discriminatory laws.  
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under national law qualify as possessions.72 In effect, the legal model governs. This 
suggests that welfare benefits should not be treated possessions as long as the restrictions 
on qualification are pre-conditions on vesting.  However, the Court has not been so 
restrictive. In its earlier cases, it allowed social welfare benefits to qualify as P1-1 
possessions, as long as the benefits were given under a contributory scheme.73 This 
excluded schemes based on "solidarity", where benefits are given on the basis of need.  
This approach reflected the view that the social function of property must be given 
weight.74 That is, the Court is sensitive to the social function of welfare benefits and the 
social context in which entitlement arises.   
In later cases, the Court dropped the requirement that only benefits that were 
'earned' through contributions should be treated as P1-1 possessions.75 This broadens the 
potential for reviewing discriminatory conditions on welfare entitlements.  In that sense, 
 
72 See ALLEN, supra note 8, at 46-57.  
73 X v. The Netherlands, 14 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 224, 240-244 (1971) (Eur. 
Comm'n on H.R.).  
74 Indeed, as explained below, some cases in which the liberal model has been 
employed suggest that property that is earned deserves greater protection than property 
that is obtained as a windfall.   
75 Willis v. United Kingdom, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 311 (2002); Koua Poirrez v. 
France, Appl. No. 40892/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 30, 2003). Cf. Staniszewski v. Poland, 
Appl. No. 53655/00, Oct. 6, 2005 (a failure to qualify for a pension due to a residency 
condition ruled out the applicability of P1-1 and Article 14). 
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the social function of welfare benefits is given even greater prominence.  However, it is 
particularly interesting that these developments also reflect a retrenchment of the 
formalist legal model, as the Court has a strong preference for setting down formal 
criteria for identifying benefits that should be treated as P1-1 possessions.  The most 
recent authority is Stec, where the Court justified abandoning the requirement of 
contributions as follows:  
In the modern, democratic State, many individuals are, for all or part of their 
lives, completely dependent for survival on social security and welfare benefits. 
Many domestic legal systems recognise that such individuals require a degree of 
certainty and security, and provide for benefits to be paid—subject to the 
fulfilment of the conditions of eligibility—as of right. Where an individual has an 
assertable right under domestic law to a welfare benefit, the importance of that 
interest should also be reflected by holding Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to be 
applicable.76 
This passage reveals both the concern with the social function of property and the legalist 
concern with neutral rules.  Themes of subsistence, reliance, dependency and security 
 
76 Appl. Nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 6, 2005) (G.C.) 
(admissibility), para. 51.  In the judgment on the merits, the Court held that treating men 
and women differently did not violate Article 14. Stec v. United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 
65731/01 and 65900/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 12, 2006) (G.C.).  P1-1 does not guarantee a 
right to ownership or control over resources necessary for basic subsistence: Kutepov and 
Anikeyenko v. Russia, Appl. No. 68029/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 25, 2005), para. 55, 62. 
Compensation and Property – Page 44 
dominate the first part of the passage.  However, the second part reveals a sense that 
interpretation must divorce the property conception from its social function; or, 
alternatively, that it is possible to capture the social function of property in formal terms.  
Hence, the Court reduces the criteria that establish whether social welfare benefits qualify 
as P1-1 possessions to the formula of an "assertable right under domestic law".  It seems 
that the Court is not convinced that introducing the social function of property directly 
into interpretive questions is either necessary or desirable. 
In general, outside the context of social welfare, the autonomous meaning 
doctrine applies in two situations.  The first arises where national law recognizes that the 
individual holds a bundle of rights, but classifies it as a personal interest rather than a 
proprietary one.77 In Gasus, for example, the Court invoked the doctrine to refute the 
argument that P1-1 only applies to interferences with the ownership of physical goods.78 
77 ALLEN, supra note 8, at 43-45.  
78 One reading of the reasoning is that did not even go that far: Belgium argued 
that the second sentence of P1-1 did not apply because there had been no "deprivation of 
possessions".  The second sentence normally applies only to the taking of an ownership 
interest, and the facts concerned the seizure of property in which the applicant held a 
security interest.  Hence, the argument was that a security interest is not a full ownership 
interest.  However, the Court held that the facts came under the third sentence, because 
the security interest was taken to enforce a tax.  The autonomous meaning doctrine was 
applied to establish that the security interest was a P1-1 possession, although it is not 
clear that Belgium disputed that point.    
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As in Stec, the Court relied on national law to determine whether there are rights that 
must be protected, but not to determine whether that bundle constitutes a property 
interest.  In such cases, the Court often fails to explain where its conception of a property 
bundle finds its source, or whether its conception is formal or functional in nature.  
Nevertheless, where it does provide some guidance, it tends to turn to comparative law in 
support of its conclusions.79 In that sense, it appears that the autonomous meaning 
doctrine is oriented to the legal model.  
The second arises where it appears that the applicant does not hold anything 
recognized as a property right under national law.  This type of case arises where the 
applicant and its government do not agree on the content of national law.  In Beyeler v. 
Italy, for example, the applicant claimed to be victimized by the taking of a painting that 
he had obtained under a void 'contract'.80 Italy maintained that P1-1 did not apply 
because the applicant had not acquired property in the painting; the applicant argued that 
Italian law did recognize that he held a form of property in it.  The dispute therefore 
turned on the interpretation of national law.  As the Court does not have the jurisdiction 
to refer the case back to the national courts for determination of a specific issue, it must 
 
79 The Court in Gasus, 306-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), gave no real indication of the 
source of its conception; however, the Commission's decision, Appl. No. 15375/89 (Eur. 
Comm'n H.R., Oct. 21, 1993) at para. 56 and 58, does refer to 'normal' scope of the 
interest in question, which suggests that comparative law guided its decision 
80 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (G.C.). 
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have some means for resolving these disputes.81 While it may seek to do so by providing 
its own interpretation of national law, it often prefers to ask only whether national 
authorities have treated the applicant as holding a property interest.  For example, in 
Beyeler, the Court noted that the Italian authorities had treated the applicant as the owner 
of the painting on a number of occasions.82 In effect, the autonomous meaning doctrine 
was used to sidestep a lack of clarity in national law, without assuming a jurisdiction to 
resolve issues of national law.   
Whether this represents a preference for the legal or social model of property is 
debatable.  On the one hand, the autonomous meaning doctrine may represent a 'best 
guess' at the content of national law.  If so, it is still based on national law, without any 
examination of the role of control and access relating to the resource in the social life of 
 
81 The Court would declare the application inadmissible if it appears that the 
applicant did not exhaust the remedies available in domestic law.  Generally, in these 
cases, the applicant has sought a resolution in the domestic courts, but the courts have not 
given a clear resolution on the issues and judicial process has dragged on for such a 
lengthy period that the Court of Human Rights is willing to consider the application. See 
e.g. Iatridis, 1999-II Eur. Ct. H.R.; Matos e Silva, lda and others v Portugal, 1996-IV 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1092 (1997).
82 Id. at 86; see also Synod College of the Evangelical Reformed Church of 
Lithuania v. Lithuania, Appl. No. 44548/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 5, 2002); cf. Kötterl and 
Schittily v. Austria, Appl. No. 32957/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 9, 2003) and see generally 
ALLEN, supra note 8 at 64-71. 
Compensation and Property – Page 47 
the applicant and community.  On the other hand, it may show that the Court regards the 
expectation, reliance and dependency created by the conduct of public officials as 
something worthy of protection, even if their basis in national law is uncertain.  If so, it 
reflects the concerns of the social welfare cases, but without the formalism of Stec. 
In the end, therefore, the doctrine of the autonomous meaning reflects the tension 
between the different schools of thought on the importance of the social function of 
property.  The potential for conflict with the integrated view of Sporrong remains in 
place.   
B. The economic model of property 
The economic model concentrates on property as wealth.  Plainly, it is compatible 
with the principle that money is commensurable with property, and hence that 
compensation is relevant to the fair balance test.  It is evident in cases such as 
Krivonogova v. Russia, where the Court stated that it would not find an interference with 
possessions unless the applicant could "demonstrate an increased financial loss".83 
Similarly, in Haider v. Austria, it dismissed an application that P1-1 applied to changes in 
land use controls because "the applicant had failed to substantiate if and to what extent 
the challenged amendment  . . . had actually reduced the value of his land".84 And, in 
Ashworth and others v. United Kingdom, it held that a planning board's decision to allow 
 
83 Appl. No. 74694/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. April 1, 2004).  
84 Appl. No. 63413/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 29, 2004). 
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an airport to increase its flights over the applicant's land did not raise any issues under 
P1-1 because there was no evidence that his house had lost value.85 
It is also evident in cases involving the imposition of a liability to pay a sum of 
money.  Under the legal model, it would not be obvious that it would qualify as an 
interference with possessions.  Of course, assets may need to be sold or seized in order to 
discharge the liability, but there is still a formal distinction between property and 
liability.86 While the language of P1-1 does not make it clear whether the imposition of a 
 
85 Appl. No. 39561/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Jan. 20, 2004).  It is still necessary to show 
that there has been a real financial loss: a diminution in the possibility of earning future 
income is not, by itself, an interference with possessions. Levänen v. Finland, Appl. No. 
34600/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 11, 2006). 
86 A similar issue arose in the United States, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 
U.S. 498 (1998), where the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the 
retroactive imposition of civil liability under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act 
of 1992.  O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Thomas, JJ., stated that the 
imposition of liability violated the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment; Kennedy, J., 
concurred in the judgment but stated that the Coal Act did not violate the takings clause, 
but substantive due process; Breyer J., joined by Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., 
dissented on both points, and stated specifically that the "application of the Takings 
Clause here bristles with conceptual difficulties".  Id. at 556.  Hence, a narrow margin of 
5-4 held that the imposition of liability was not, by itself, a taking of property.    
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liability, by itself, is an interference with possessions, the Court has assumed that it is.87 
The Court has never explained why it made this assumption, but it does suggest that 
moved beyond the formality of the legal model to an economic model of property. 
In relation to compensation, the economic model has a narrow focus. It is not the 
economic security of the individual that is important, but simply the market value of the 
property.  The focus is on the value to the community, as expressed through the market, 
rather than the function of the property in the life of the owner.88 In the vast majority of 
cases, the overall impact on the victim's economic security is ignored.  There are some 
isolated exceptions: for example, in Azinas, some members of the Court were concerned 
that the withdrawal of a pension would take away the sole means of subsistence of the 
applicant and his family: in other words, it was not just the value of the pension, but the 
role of that pension to the individual's security that was important.89 Nevertheless, 
 
87 The third sentence refers to takings or controls on property to "secure" the 
payment of taxes, contributions or penalties, but not their imposition as such.  Only in 
Gasus, 306-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) at 48-49 do we see signs of doubt: the Court 
stated that "procedural" measures for the enforcement of tax were within P1-1, but 
declined to express an opinion on "substantive" tax laws. In other cases, the Court has 
assumed that substantive laws are within P1-1: see e.g., ŠpaWek v. Czech Republic, Appl. 
No. 26449/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 9, 1999). 
88 See Ellickson, supra note 6. 
89 Appl. No. 56679/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 20, 2002) (Third Section) reversed on 
other grounds in 2004-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (G.C.); see also Jokela v. Finland, 2002-IV Eur. 
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subject to the exceptions discussed in the next section, payment of market value 
compensation is normally sufficient to strike a fair balance, irrespective of the economic 
impact of the taking on the specific individual.  By contrast, with other Convention 
rights, the social function of the interest at stake is viewed broadly, and the Court is more 
willing to consider the impact of state action on the individual's social relationships.90 In 
this respect, the economic model also pulls P1-1 away from the integrated theory of 
Sporrong.
Characterizing the impact solely in terms of objective values limits the flexibility 
and utility of the fair balance.  In principle, the fair balance principle allows states to say 
that certain public objectives may justify a departure from ordinary compensation 
standards, but the application of the economic model restricts the possibility of doing so.  
In most cases, the state's justification for taking property turns on the social advantages 
that would accrue from the change in ownership and use of the property.  Hence, the 
weight given to the public interest side of the balance takes into account factors that are 
ignored when assessing the impact of the taking on the property owner.  Not only is this 
inconsistent, but the idea that the balance may be struck when only the economic impact 
is weighed on one side means that no real content needs to be given to the other side.  It 
makes it unnecessary to evaluate the importance or weight of the social advantages that 
 
Ct. H.R. 1; Solodyuk v. Russia, Appl. No. 67099/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 12, 2005); 
Banfield v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 6223/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 18, 2005). 
90 See Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and Article 10 
(freedom of expression). 
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supports the taking: instead, it is often enough to say simply that there is a public 
interest.91 As such, in practical terms it is very close to the legal model, because it does 
not require the Court to develop its own substantive standards for takings.  Instead, the 
Court has faith that national legislative and judicial processes will achieve the standard of 
fairness that human rights requires. 
C. The social model of property 
The social model reflects a concern with the social function of property.  In this 
respect, it is similar to the economic model, although it does not focus so narrowly on the 
function of property in market exchanges.  Like the legal model, it reflects the liberal 
concern with the values of individual autonomy, dignity and equality that underpin other 
Convention rights.  However, the social model does not focus so narrowly on property as 
an autonomous zone, free from state interference.  It recognizes that the allocation of 
property rights to one person necessarily restricts the choice of another; indeed, it is as 
much the function of the law of property to restrict choices as it is to enable them.92 
Moreover, the state has a continuing role in ensuring that the allocation of power over 
resources conforms with the collective's ideas of justice and fairness.  Redistributive and 
 
91 Indeed, this is the pattern in the vast majority of cases.  In general, the Court 
does not judge the legitimacy or rationality of purpose of taking by anything more than a 
weak standard of good faith. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 130-35. 
92 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 58, at 141. ("Where rights to external, physical, 
finite resources are concerned, the establishment of a property regime itself is a 
necessarily and unavoidably allocative act.")   
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regulatory laws must be seen in this light.  Hence, both the claims of individuals and the 
collective are grounded in social life: the individual requires control and access to 
resources that enable a meaningful role in social life, and the state seeks to ensure that the 
distribution and use of resources reflects social goals relating to (for example) justice, 
equality, dignity, and economic growth that is sustainable and environmentally sound.  
The public interest is reflected not only in the reason for taking (or regulating) property, 
but in the initial decision to recognize the individual as the owner of the property.  That 
is, both the initial allocation and the subsequent re-allocation of resources are decisions 
that engage the public interest, and the content of property is continually revised and can 
only be understood in the social context in which it exists.  It is this acceptance of the 
variability of the content of property that makes the social model consistent with the 
integrated view of Sporrong, because the fair balance test requires an open, contextual 
approach to P1-1.  For example, in James, the Court accepted that social goals may 
justify redistribution, without any guarantee of full or even partial indemnity from loss.  
Moreover, it confirms that achieving a just distribution remains an ongoing project for the 
state.   
(i) The commensurability of money and property under the social model 
The integrated theory of Sporrong raises questions over the use of money as a 
substitute for property, since it does not serve this function with other human rights. For 
example, an interference with freedom of religion may be justified by showing that a 
compelling public interest outweighed the individual's interests, but not by showing that 
she was paid money as a substitute for the opportunity to exercise her beliefs.  Under the 
integrated theory, the Court ought to take into account the function that the property plays 
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in the owner's social, economic and political relationships.  Put differently, the fair 
balance test should be applied so that the interference does not have an excessive impact 
on the owner's autonomy and dignity (or other interests under the social model).   
By this view, the argument that compensation is relevant to the fair balance only 
makes sense to the extent that money can provide a substitute for the interests recognized 
under the social model.  Given the nature of those interests, it may be difficult to decide 
whether money really is a substitute for the property.  If, for example, we focus on the 
relationship between property and individual autonomy, the impact of a taking would be 
minimized by paying the owner the amount that she would have demanded under a 
consensual sale, and perhaps an additional amount to reflect the loss of the power to 
withhold consent.  Plainly, it may be difficult to determine what the owner's price would 
have been after the taking has already been completed.  However, as some commentators 
have noted, subjective valuation is not intractable in every situation.93 In some cases, 
such as those involving fungible or investment property, it is highly likely that money 
 
93 Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV 957, 
963 ("the use of the word 'subjective' should not be understood as implying that these 
valuations are always befogged by sentimentality or emotion. Subjective value can 
include such 'hard' components as the out-of-pocket cost of moving to another place, the 
search costs of finding shops and services in the new location, or site-specific 
improvements that are well-suited to the owner's uses but do not enhance fair market 
value."); Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for 
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677.
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would enable the owner to obtain a reasonable substitute.  This would also be the case 
with property that has been adapted for an idiosyncratic use, assuming that property 
suitable for a similar adaptation could be obtained.  Even in the case of property essential 
for subsistence, it may be possible for money to act as a substitute.  While no rational 
person would give up their means of subsistence for nothing, there may be some amount 
of money that would enable the individual to achieve a similar degree of security with 
other resources.94 
It would mean, of course, that valuation is not subjective to the point that the 
owner could set her price at any figure, and then argue that the fair balance was not struck 
because she received something less than her price.  The Court would need to consider 
the actual use and relevance of the property to the owner, but also to require element of 
reasonableness in seeking a substitute that would perform same function in owner's life.  
Alternatively, it could be said that the fair balance does not require indemnity against all 
loss: again, there would be a need for a judgment by the Court in determining what is just 
 
94 A related example arose in the United Kingdom, in relation to compensation for 
homes in areas of low demand.  In areas where housing prices had fell relative to the 
general trend, market value compensation would not enable the owner to buy a home 
elsewhere.  The possibility of awarding compensation on a home-for-a-home basis was 
discussed, and in many cases it would have come closer to the owner's subjective 
valuation of the home; but ultimately it was decided that this would go further than P1-1 
required.  See ALLEN, supra note 8 at 178-79 for a discussion.   
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and reasonable.  But either way, the balancing exercise would take into account the social 
function of property and the owner's own preferences. 
In some cases, money would not provide a substitute under the social model.  
Compensation would be of little value in respect of an object of religious veneration, 
personal correspondence, or for anything closely tied to individual identity.  Moreover, 
even if the owner did receive the amount that they would have demanded in a consensual 
transaction, there may still be an intangible impact relating to the loss of the opportunity 
to refuse consent.  This is not to say that such property cannot be expropriated: as with a 
number of other Convention rights, an interference with strongly personal interests may 
be justified by the need to pursue a sufficiently compelling public interest.  Instead, it 
means that the Court would not approach the balancing test by saying that the payment of 
money reduced the impact of the taking to a negligible level.  It would be necessary to 
evaluate the impact that remains, and to decide whether the objective was sufficiently 
important to outweigh it.   
The key problem with the present law is its failure to identify the residual impact 
suffered by the owner, whether measurable in money or not.  Indeed, leaving aside the 
question of incommensurable interests of the social model of property, the Court has not 
even acknowledged that subjective valuation might be appropriate in some 
circumstances.   
To be sure, there are some isolated cases that do reflect the social model.  As 
explained above, in Azinas, the Court held that the withdrawal of the applicant's pension 
as a penalty for fraud did not strike a fair balance, in part because it deprived him and his 
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family "of any means of subsistence".95 While Azinas did not relate to compensation on a 
taking for public use, it does demonstrate a concern with the broader social function of 
property.   
Subsistence is not the only area of concern.  In Pincová and Pinc v. Czech 
Republic,96 the applicants were left unable to buy a home after it was taken for less than 
its market value.  The failure to consider their personal circumstances and their 
"uncertain, and indeed difficult, social situation" meant that the taking did not strike the 
fair balance.97 In Lallement v. France,98 the Court required more than market value 
compensation for the expropriation of a portion of the applicant's farm.  He was paid a 
fair amount for the portion that was taken, but received nothing for the related loss of 
profit on the remaining part.  The relevant law did provide a right to demand that the 
entire farm be purchased at its fair value, but the applicant chose not to do so because he 
did not wish to leave the family home.  The Court suggested that the right to sell the 
 
95 Appl. No. 56679/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 20, 2002) (Third Section) at para. 44.  
The case was referred to the Grand Chamber, Azinas, 2004-III Eur. Ct. H.R,  which held 
that the application was inadmissible on technical grounds relating to the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies.  Eleven of the 17 judges in the Grand Chamber declined to say 
anything on the merits; one of the judges agreed with the Third Section and five 
disagreed.   
96 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 
97 Id. at 331; see also id. at 332. 
98 Appl. No. 46044/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. April 11, 2002). 
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entire property might provide a sufficient counterbalance in some cases, but given the 
applicant's attachment to his home, it did not do so in this case.  Hence, the assessment of 
the impact of the taking should have taken the loss of profit into account.   
The function of property in the expression of personal beliefs was relevant in 
Chassagnou v. France,99 where the Court held that laws requiring certain landowners to 
allow hunting on their property violated P1-1100 partly because the landowners in 
question were strongly opposed to hunting and sought to use their land as a wildlife 
preserve:   
Compelling small landowners to transfer hunting rights over their land so that 
others can make use of them in a way which is totally incompatible with their 
beliefs imposes a disproportionate burden which is not justified under the second 
paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.101 
France argued that its laws struck a fair balance, because the applicants were given the 
reciprocal right to hunt on the land of others. However, the Court held that this did not 
constitute "any measure of compensation for landowners opposed to hunting, who, by 
definition, do not wish to derive any advantage or profit from a right to hunt which they 
refuse to exercise."102 On the other hand, in Piippo v. Sweden, it held that similar rules 
 
99 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 21. 
100 As well as Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and Article 
11 (freedom of assembly and association). 
101 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 58.   
102 Id. at 57.  
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did not violate P1-1, despite the applicant's inability to gain access to the land of others, 
because his inability arose from personal circumstances unconnected with conscience and 
personal belief.103 
These examples provide some evidence of a concern with the social function of 
property.104 Not only is the importance of property in the social life of the owner 
recognized, but the Court implicitly suggests that some personal choices demand greater 
protection than others.  This is not merely a question of determining whether the public 
interest for the taking is sufficiently compelling, but whether the burden should be 
regarded as being as severe as the owner claims. It is worth noting that, in Lallement, it 
was important that the applicant had acted reasonably in refusing the offer to buy out his 
entire interest.  As the Court put it, he could not be faulted for wishing to remain in the 
family home; otherwise, the possibility of selling the entire plot would have been 
relevant.105 Similarly, in Chassagnou, the Court remarked that the owners' beliefs 
regarding hunting "attain a certain level of cogency, cohesion and importance and are 
 
103 Appl. No. 70518/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 21, 2006). 
104 In cases not involving expropriation, where compensation has not been 
contested, the Court has shown greater concern with the protection of the home under P1-
1: see, e.g., Venditelli v. Italy, 293-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) (sealing of flat as part 
of criminal investigation); Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79 (G.C.) 
(failure to protect dwelling from destruction; compensation in the form of alternative 
accommodation was not sufficient, given the nature of the harm).  
105 Appl. No. 46044/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. April 11, 2002) at para. 22.  
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therefore worthy of respect in a democratic society".106 In both cases, there is a sense of 
the social value and function of property.  Under the legal model, the social value of the 
rights in question would not be the subject of investigation by the Court.  This is not to 
say that it has no relevance to property law generally, but only that the decisions relating 
to the social value of property rights are made at the national level.  Under the economic 
model, the social value is recognized, but only as far as it is reflected in the market value 
of the property.  
These cases are exceptional, however.  Lallement is the only case where the Court 
has suggested that the market value was insufficient because the owner derived special 
value from the land.  In any case, it was not the value of the land that was taken that was 
significant, but the impact on the land that remained.  In Pincová, the compensation was 
based on the price the applicants had paid for the property many years earlier: if they had 
been paid the current market price, the fair balance would not have been upset. Moreover, 
while both Lallement and Chassagnou and show that the Court does consider personal 
factors in some situations, it must be noted that these cases concerned owners who were 
left in possession.  Neither case dealt with the expropriation of the entire plot of land.  It 
 
106 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 at 66. This statement was made in relation to the 
right to freedom of association, but it should also apply to P1-1, as it would be logical for 
the Court to apply the same standard of cogency to compulsion to join a hunting 
association and compulsion to allow hunting (and refusing to exercise the right to hunt on 
the land of others). 
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is doubtful that the applicants in either Chassagnou or Lallement would have had a strong 
case if the government had expropriated their entire landholding at market value.   
(ii) Unearned value and the social model  
There is one area where the social model is used in the fair balance test in a more 
consistent manner.  These cases deal with windfalls, where states argue that the fair 
balance can be struck without full compensation.  Their arguments relate both sides of the 
balance.  The key point is that there is a real balancing of interests in these cases.  Not 
only is the balance approached with greater flexibility, but there is also a willingness to 
consider factors that would not be relevant under the other models. 
James, the first case in which these points were discussed, concerned British 
legislation that gave long-lease residential tenants the right to force their landlords to sell 
them the freehold of the property.  The landlords claimed that this violated P1-1 because, 
among other things, the price was determined by a formula that excluded the value of the 
buildings.  In response, the British government argued that, since most long-term leases 
obligated tenants to maintain the buildings in their original state, the tenants should not 
be required to pay for them when acquiring the freehold.  In its view, by the end of a long 
lease, the building would be virtually worthless without the tenant's upkeep; if required to 
pay for the building, she would have paid twice over for the same asset.107 Not 
surprisingly, the landlords objected that the rental charges would have been greater 
without the obligation to maintain.  Nevertheless, the Court held that P1-1 was not 
violated.  As a matter of general principle, it accepted that compensation should be 
 
107 James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37.   
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related to the value of the property, but declared that different standards could apply to 
"measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice."108 
The "social justice" of the situation meant that the compensation rules were not unfair: as 
the Court put it, "the tenant and his predecessors are deemed already to have paid for the 
house."109 
The sense of injustice has its roots in Eric Kades's observation that that people are 
both risk-averse and windfall-averse.110 Ordinarily, they not only wish to share the 
burden of unpredictable and undeserved losses, but also to share the benefit of 
unpredictable and undeserved gains.  Of course, agreement on the sharing of windfalls 
would only be obtained if there was some assurance that sharing was indeed the general 
rule.  Individuals would not be content to give up a windfall unless they were satisfied 
that others would give up theirs. But instead of attempting to bring in general rules on 
windfall sharing, European governments have tended to promote ad hoc responses to 
specific circumstances, as prompted by the perception that other issues of fairness should 
be addressed. 
For example, the social value of opportunist behavior has been a factor in some 
cases.  It represents the converse of Lallement and Chassagnou, where the Court 
recognized the value of the social function of the property in question.  In those cases, it 
was the attachment to the family home (Lallement) and the expression of beliefs of 
 
108 Id. at 36. 
109 Id. at 37. 
110 Windfalls, 108 YALE L. J. 1489, 1491 (1998-99). 
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"cogency, cohesion and importance" (Chassagnou) that were at stake.  As the Court 
plainly considered these to be of social value, there was a stronger argument for 
recognizing them when assessing the impact on the applicants.  The opposite arose in 
National & Provincial Building Society v. United Kingdom111 and Jahn v. Germany.112 
Briefly, in National & Provincial, the applicants paid money on account of a tax that was 
subsequently determined to be invalid, due to a drafting error in the relevant legislation.  
Jahn is similar, as it was said that the applicants managed to obtain title to land in the 
former German Democratic Republic by exploiting administrative failings in the socialist 
bureaucracy.  Their titles were then confirmed by a drafting error in the GDR's "Modrow 
Law" on property, which was passed in the final stages of the socialist regime.   
Hence, both applicants benefited from inadvertent errors.  In both cases, their 
governments sought to reverse the errors: in National & Provincial, the legislature 
imposed the tax with retroactive effect and extinguished the applicants' claims for 
restitution of the amounts paid; in Jahn, after re-unification, the Federal Republic of 
Germany sought to recover the land from the applicants, without compensation.113 In 
 
111 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2325. 
112 Appl. Nos. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 30, 2005) 
(Grand Chamber).  
113 Indeed, in Jahn, id., the Court accepted that the legislature had merely sought 
to plug a "loophole" in the Modrow Law: id. para. 84 ("The German legislature sought to 
remedy the loopholes in the Modrow Law . . ." and id. para. 106 (" . . . the Federal 
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both cases, the Court regarded the applicants as opportunists who had obtained their 
property by exploiting administrative failings and statutory loopholes.  The gains were 
neither unearned nor unexpected, in the sense that the applicants took positive action to 
exploit the administrative oversights and errors.114 However, it was clear that the Court 
accepted the states' position that seeking to exploit such errors would have little social 
value.115 If anything, the recovery of these gains would serve the public interest by 
discouraging opportunist behavior.   
 
Constitutional Court's finding . . . that the Modrow Law contained a 'hidden legislative 
loophole' does not appear to be unjustified.") 
114 Compare National & Provincial, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. with Dangeville SA 
v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 71: in Dangeville, a refusal to restore an improperly 
assessed (and collected) tax did not violate P1-1, partly because the applicants had not 
benefited from an unintended loophole in the legislation. 
115 The reasoning is similar in Former King of Greece v. Greece, XII Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 119 (2001) (merits) (Grand Chamber), (2003) 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD 43 (Grand 
Chamber) (just satisfaction), where Greece argued that it could take property from its 
former king without compensation, on the basis that he had acquired it by means of state 
contributions and then retained it under the military regime because he failed to put up 
any resistance to it.  The Court ultimately held that he was entitled to compensation, 
although the actual amount awarded in damages fell far below the market value of the 
property.    
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It is also clear, however, that the Court does not invariably take this view.  The 
tension between the models of property is particularly evident in cases involving 
transitional justice. As explained above, in Stran Greek, the Court was reluctant to allow 
the Greek government to deny compensation on the basis of the applicant's relationship 
with the old regime.  Similarly, in Pincová116 and Zvolský and Zvolská v. Czech 
Republic,117 the Court held that full compensation should be provided unless there was 
strong evidence that the current owner obtained the property by active participation in the 
abuses of the former regime. These cases concerned Czech restitution laws that allowed 
those whose property had been confiscated under the communist government to recover it 
from the current owners.  As the price payable was based on the current owners' original 
cost and the cost of maintenance during their occupation of the property, it often fell far 
below the current market value.  The Czech government defended the compensation 
standard on the basis that it only applied where the current owner had not acted in good 
faith when acquiring the property.  Under the relevant statutes, good faith was established 
if the current owner had paid full value and complied the rules in force at the time of 
acquisition.  The applicants did not fulfill these conditions.  In that sense, they were 
opportunists and arguably in the same position as the applicants in Jahn.  Nevertheless, 
the Court held that the fair balance would not be struck unless they were given the full 
market value for the property. 
 
116 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R.  311. 
117 2002-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 163.   
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Jahn therefore appears to represent a strong statement in favor of the social model 
of property.118 Even so, it is unlikely that it has resolved the uncertainty over the choice 
of the appropriate model of property, as a quick review of the voting pattern 
demonstrates.  The Third Section decided 7-0 that Germany violated P1-1 and Grand 
Chamber 11-6 that it did not, but two of the dissenting judges in the Grand Chamber were 
also members of the Third Section panel.  Hence, the seventeen judges of the Court that 
gave opinions in Jahn split 11-11.119 It is quite possible that the majority of the 
remaining 28 judges of the Court who did not sit in either the Grand Chamber or Third 
Section would have required compensation.  
Opportunism is not the only factor that spurs governments to action.  They have 
also justified the taking of windfalls in terms of the need to address inequality. It is not 
merely that some group managed to benefit from lapses in government, whether by 
effort, evasion, or dumb luck, but that some other similarly-placed group that did not 
benefit.  This was an important consideration in Jahn, as the German government was 
responding to the widely held view that failing to correct the Modrow Law would be 
 
118 Pincová, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. and Zvolský, 2002-IX Eur. Ct. H.R are 
admittedly more equivocal, as the references to the importance of full compensation for 
the home suggests that a mix of liberal and legalist perspectives affected the judgment. 
119 Mr. J.-P. Costa was the only judge who participated in all three cases.  He 
decided in favor of the applicants in Pincová, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. and Zvolský, 2002-
IX Eur. Ct. H.R (both were unanimous judgments) and dissented in the Grand Chamber 
in Jahn, Appl. Nos. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 30, 2005).
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unfair on those who had complied with the socialist law and lost title as a result.  This 
concern may also lie behind the reasoning in the National & Provincial case.  Here, the 
British government claimed that the loophole was an unintended effect of a changeover 
to a new system for tracking the interest income of financial institutions.  The changeover 
was intended to be neutral, but if the applicants' claims prevailed, they would have 
received a tax holiday that would have been denied to other financial institutions and 
their depositors.   
The desire to address opportunism and inequality would be accepted as a valid 
public interest in support of the taking itself, but the real question is whether they justify 
the reduction or complete denial of compensation.  Under the comparative theory of P1-
1, it might be possible to construct an argument in support of the results in National & 
Provincial and Jahn, if one could say that there is no clear common standard in the 
member states in respect of these kinds of takings.  However, this was not the approach 
taken: instead, the Court relied on the fair balance test.120 Indeed, it is also apparent that 
the Court considered the impact of these takings on the applicants.   
This goes back to Kades's comparison of 'risk' of receiving an unexpected 
windfall with the risk of an unexpected loss.  In general, the taking of a windfall is not 
felt with the same intensity as the taking of an earned asset. This point is made in 
 
120 In any case, the Third Section in Jahn, Appl. No. 56679/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 
20, 2002), which took the legalist approach, did not suggest that there was an absence of 
common standards that might justify the denial of compensation.  
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National & Provincial,121 where the Court stated that taking steps to reverse the drafting 
defect, with retroactive effect, did not violate the fair balance:  
There is in fact an obvious and compelling public interest to ensure that private 
entities do not enjoy the benefit of a windfall in a changeover to a new tax-
payment regime and do not deny the Exchequer revenue simply on account of 
inadvertent defects in the enabling tax legislation, the more so when such entities 
have followed the debates on the original proposal in Parliament and, while 
disagreeing with that proposal, have clearly understood that it was Parliament's 
firm intention to incorporate it in legislation.122  
While this passage is framed in terms of the public interest, it also discloses a belief that 
the extinction of the restitution claims was not the loss that it appeared to be.  In 
particular, the Court makes the point that the loophole was an unexpected result of an 
"inadvertent defects".  Elsewhere, it emphasized the Government's statements that the tax 
would be retroactively validated, and hence that an expectation of retention should have 
been weak.123 
121 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2325.  This puts the focus on the reasons for the 
takings, rather than their impact on the landlords. In other words, the Court did not say 
that the tenants' contributions to the upkeep somehow reduced the burden on the 
landlords.  However, the suggestion was made that the landlords got something for 
nothing, and therefore have less reason to complain.   
122 National & Provincial, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2354. 
123 Id. at 2350, 2354. 
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These points would only be relevant under the social model of property.  They do 
not arise under the legal model, because the asset in question took the form of claims for 
the restitution of amounts that had already been paid;124 neither the manner in which the 
claims arose nor the reasons for the eventual extinction affected their status as property 
within the English legal system.  Under the economic model, the degree of political risk 
of extinction of the outstanding restitution claims could have been significant, if it 
reduced their value.  Of course, the claims would have had at least some value as long as 
the risk fell short of a certainty.125 However, neither the Court nor the British 
 
124 The revenue authorities initially did not accept that the loophole even existed, 
and collected the money anyway. 
125 It is worth noting that the Grand Chamber made no attempt to assess the 
impact of uncertainty on the value of the property, as it might have done if it had applied 
the economic model of property.  It has done so in other cases: in Broniowski v. Poland,
2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R 1 (G.C.), for example, the risk that claims to land would not be 
satisfied by the state was sufficiently great that the Grand Chamber suggested that the 
claims could be extinguished, with compensation that reflected the degree of risk. This 
may have been behind the judgment of the Third Section in Jahn, Appl. Nos. 46720/99 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 22, 2004): that is, it may have concluded that the fair balance would 
be satisfied by compensation that would have reflected the degree of uncertainty.  Indeed, 
there have been cases where the degree of uncertainty has been so great that the Court has 
held that the applicants do not hold possessions in any form.  ALLEN, supra note 8 at 46-
57.  The Grand Chamber did not make that finding in Jahn.
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government sought to justify the uncompensated extinction of the claims on this basis.  
The judgment follows the social model of property, as the emphasis on the unexpected 
and unearned nature of the tax benefit recognizes that there may be a stronger personal 
identification with assets that are earned than those obtained as a windfall.  Consequently, 
the sense of loss that would follow from an uncompensated taking would often be less 
than it would with, for example, property that was earned or inherited from a close 
relative.126 
126 Perhaps if the building societies had 'earned' the tax holiday by direct 
lobbying, the result would have been different. Indeed, the gain in National & Provincial,
1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R.,  might be characterized in two ways, depending on whether one 
focuses on the the loophole produced by the initial error in statutory drafting or the 
subsequent judgment of the House of Lords that gave validity to the restitution claims.  
The loophole itself produced a true windfall.  If the government had reversed it 
immediately, the impact on the building societies would have been minimal under the 
liberal model of property.  However, the possibility that the British government would 
not retroactively impose the tax or extinguish the restitution claims was enough to induce 
the test case to go ahead, and from that investment, the social benefit of the clarification 
of the legal rules on restitution was obtained.  In a sense, the British government 
acknowledged this point, as it accepted that it was bound by the test case and did not 
attempt to reverse its result by extinguishing the test case litigant's right to restitution.  
However, the Court observed that the applicants did not make a similar investment:  
Arguably, the litigants that did not join the test case did not make a similar investment; 
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The Court in National & Provincial also recognized that reliance that builds up 
over time.  Owners often come to have a stronger personal identification with property 
the longer it is held, with the result that a taking that might have had a relatively slight 
impact could have a more severe impact if it is delayed.  Hence, the Court also 
highlighted the Government's statements that it would reverse the defect.  In those 
circumstances, no reliance could have arisen.  Together, the cost-free acquisition of the 
asset and the relatively short duration of its possession, meant that the impact was not as 
great as it might have appeared. 
The judgment in Jahn generally confirms the approach in National & Provincial.
The case was initially heard by the Third Section of the Court,127 which produced a 
 
the judgment of the Court says only that the party in the test case had borne the costs and 
risks of litigation (see id. 2356-57).  Consequently, the applicants could not claim to be in 
the same position as the test case litigant.  See Stere v. Romania, Appl. No. 25632/02 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 23, 2006): the facts were similar to National & Provincial, 1997-VII 
Eur. Ct. H.R., except that the Romanian authorities allowed the case to proceed through 
to judgment, and paid the judgment debt, before seeking to extinguish it retroactively and 
recover the amounts repaid; the Court held that, having repaid the money, it would be 
unfair to recover it.   
127 Cases are initially heard by one of four Sections of the Court.  The Grand 
Chamber of the Court is composed of seventeen judges, who include, as ex officio 
members, the President, the two Vice-Presidents and the two Section Presidents (two of 
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judgment that is noteworthy for its adherence to the legal model of property.  For the 
Third Section, it was enough that the German courts held that the applicants held title 
before P1-1 was extended to the former GDR.  The manner in which they had acquired 
the property was not important.128 By contrast, the Grand Chamber noted that the 
 
the Vice-Presidents also serve as Section Presidents).  The state party may also elect one 
one of the judges to both the Section and the Grand Chamber panels.   
128 Jahn, Appl. Nos. 46720/99, at para. 90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 22, 2004) (Third 
Section) ("The Court cannot . . . agree with the Government's reasoning in the instant 
case regarding the concept of “illegitimate” ownership, which is an eminently political 
concept . . . regardless of the applicants' situation before the entry into force of the 
Modrow Law, there is no doubt that they legally acquired full ownership of their land 
when that Law came into force.")  A related example where the question of equality and 
ethical basis of entitlements were raised is provided by the related cases Draon v. France, 
Appl. No. 1513/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 10, 2005) (G.C.), Maurice v. France, Appl. 
No.11810/03 (June 10, 2005) (G.C.).  Both dealt with French legislation that 
extinguished potential and pending tort claims for wrongful life/birth based on negligence 
in the pre-natal diagnosis of the child's disabilities.  The French government argued that 
the legislation was necessary in the pursuit of justice, in order to ensure that all disabled 
children received the same degree of support (other factors were also cited, including the 
potential impact of negligence claims on the health service).  Accordingly, the fair 
balance could be struck without providing compensation for those whose claims were 
still pending when the legislation took effect.  See Draon, id. at para. 62-64 and Maurice,
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applicants had "undeniably benefited" from a "windfall" as a result of the Modrow Law. 
129 Moreover, the burden of the taking had to be assessed in the light of the known risk 
that the Modrow Law would be repealed or amended: the transition to the re-unification 
of Germany was "inevitably marked by upheavals and uncertainties" and the Modrow 
Law itself was unclear in important respects.130 The Grand Chamber also emphasized the 
lapse of time, as it stated that the legislature had acted "within a reasonable time" to plug 
the loophole in the Modrow Law.131 The suggestion is that inaction would have allowed 
the expectation of continued ownership to strengthen, with the result that compensation 
might have been required before title could be taken.   
This review of the case law suggests that the Court has not always been fully 
committed to the integrated theory.  Periodically, it does seem to make an attempt to 
resolve the tension between integrated and comparative theories, and between legal, 
 
id., para. 75-77.  The Court accepted that the legislation pursued a legitimate aim, but 
stated, with very little discussion, that there was no justification for extinguishing 
pending claims without compensation. 
129 Jahn, Appl. Nos. 46720/99, at para. 116 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 30, 2005) (Grand 
Chamber). ("Given the 'windfall' from which the applicants undeniably benefited as a 
result of the Modrow Law under the rules applicable in the GDR to the heirs to land 
acquired under the land reform, the fact that this was done without paying any 
compensation was not disproportionate.") 
130 Id. 
131 Id.
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economic and social models.  Sporrong and Jahn are two of the strongest examples. 
However, the balancing that supposedly occurs is in fact often done without any real 
attempt to assess how compensation affects the impact of the interference on the property 
owner, or whether the public interest outweighs the impact (whether or not the state pays 
full compensation).   
III. VALUATION ISSUES AND THE SOCIAL MODEL OF PROPERTY
One might argue that the Court does accept the fair balance as a matter of 
principle, but applies the market standard in the belief that it is most likely to achieve 
justice in most cases.  Above all, the Convention and its Protocols must be given effect, 
and the adoption of a relatively rigid standard may be more likely to secure the protection 
of human rights than the application of open-ended balancing tests.   
Two practical points might be raised in defense of this position.  To begin with, 
the social model may appear to set an impossible standard for the fair balance test: surely 
any workable balancing exercise involving property must exclude factors for which 
accurate valuation is either very difficult or impossible.132 The second concerns the 
burden of the ever-increasing workload faced by the Court.  Property cases provide a 
significant number of these applications.  The Court must find some means of providing 
justice in these cases.  Arguably, it cannot do so in a timely fashion if it engages in the 
detailed, open-ended examination of the circumstances that the fair balance requires.  
Each of these points are considered and dismissed below.  
 
132 See Ellickson, supra note 6 at 736 ("The imprecision of market values may 
also be tolerable because of the resulting savings in administrative costs.")  
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A. The problem of subjective valuation 
As explained above, there are isolated cases in which the Court has put a 
monetary figure on subjective elements of the interference.133 Moreover, the Court's own 
practice suggests that it does not regard the assessment of the subjective impact of an 
interference with property as an insurmountable problem.  Where it has decided that the 
state has breached P1-1, the award of just satisfaction often includes an amount for non-
pecuniary damages, which is intended to reflect the emotional suffering caused by the 
breach of human rights.134 The amounts awarded are significant (but not overly 
generous).135 Hence, the Court's own practice suggests that it can recognize aspects of 
 
133 E.g. Lallement, Appl. No. 46044/99 and Chassagnou, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 
134 DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, 298, 
307-310 (2005). 
135 For example, most of the landlords in the Italian eviction cases were awarded 
non-pecuniary damages for the distress and anguish arising from inability to recover 
possession for a prolonged period; amounts awarded were generally between about EUR 
3,000-10,000.   See e.g. Massimo Rosa v. Italy, Appl. No. 36249/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 
17, 2003) (5,000 EUR); Clucher v. Italy, Appl. No. 36268/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 17, 
2003) (3,000 EUR); Pannocchia v. Italy, Appl. No. 37008/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 17, 
2003) (ITL 12,000,000 i.e. EUR 6,197.48); Fegatelli v. Italy, Appl. No. 39735/98 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Apr. 3, 2003) (10,000 EUR); L.M. v. Italy, Appl. No. 41610/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Apr. 3, 2003) 3,000 EUR; and Malescia v. Italy, Appl. No. 42343/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 
3, 2003) (3,000 EUR ). 
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subjective loss, despite the impossibility of precise quantification.136 In any case, this 
objection mistakes the nature of the balancing test under the integrated theory.  The 
function of compensation is not to eliminate the impact of a taking.  Instead, it should 
bring the impact down to a level that it is not excessive, when set against the public 
interest served by the interference.  But since the public interest itself is not necessarily 
measurable in monetary terms, it should follow that subjective elements of the 
interference need not be measurable in monetary terms in order to be recognized by the 
Court.   
The Court's near-automatic conclusion that the payment of the market value is 
sufficient also ignores the potential flexibility of the fair balance.  For example, with 
highly personal property, it could require the state to show that the interference was 
strictly necessary in order to achieve the public objective.  Put differently, it would ask 
whether there were less intrusive means of achieving the same objective.137 This test 
applies under the Convention rights that permit interferences where "necessary in a 
democratic society".  If the Court had followed through with the integrated theory, it 
might have incorporated this aspect of the proportionality test into P1-1.  That it did not 
do so may have reflected continuing unease over the risks of judicial activism in relation 
 
136 For example, in Chassagnou, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R., the Court did not make 
an award for pecuniary damage, but did award FRF 30,000 to each applicant for non-
pecuniary damage.   
137 See Sunday Times, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38-42 and Olsson, 130 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) at 31.   
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to economic and social planning.  In any case, the fair balance test under P1-1 does not 
require strict necessity.  This follows from James, where the landlords argued that the 
injustice of the tenancy system could have been addressed by something less drastic than 
"extreme remedy of expropriation".138 The Court did not agree: 
This amounts to reading a test of strict necessity into the Article [P1-1], an 
interpretation which the Court does not find warranted.  The availability of 
alternative solutions does not in itself render the leasehold reform legislation 
unjustified; it constitutes one factor, along with others, relevant for determining 
whether the means chosen could be regarded as reasonable and suited to 
achieving the legitimate aim being pursued, having regard to the need to strike a 
"fair balance".  Provided the legislature remained within these bounds, it is not for 
the Court to say whether the legislation represented the best  solution for dealing 
with the problem or whether the legislative discretion should have been exercised 
in another way.139 
The Court has generally followed this line in property cases140 without making a 
distinction for highly personal property.141 In practical terms, strict necessity only 
 
138 James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35.  
139 Id. 
140 See e.g., Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990); Tre Traktörer 
Aktiebolag v. Sweden, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A);  Smits, Kleyn, Mettler Toledo BV et 
al, Raymakers, Vereniging Landelijk Overleg Betuweroute and Van Helden v. The 
Netherlands, Appl. Nos. 39032/97, 39343/98, 39651/98, 43147/98, 46664/99, 61707/00 
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(Eur. Ct. H.R. May 3, 2001); cf. Rosenzweig and Bonded Warehouses Ltd. v. Poland, 
Appl. No. 51728/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 28, 2005) (at para. 56, the Court suggests that 
strict necessity is the test, but does not pursue the point in the rest of the judgment).   
Strict necessity is generally required where the state argues that the pursuit of a legitimate 
aim justifies unlawful activity, in the sense that the Court is unwilling to accept that the 
aim could not have been pursued by lawful (i.e. less drastic) means.  See e.g., Allard v. 
Sweden, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 207.   
141 See, for example, Gerasimova v. Russia, Appl. No. 24077/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Mar. 25, 2004), where the applicant complained that the taking of her flat had a 
disproportionate impact on her because she would be forced to relocate a considerable 
distance from her community.  The Court briefly considered the importance of her social 
ties in her old community, but only in relation to a separate claim under Article 8 (right to 
respect for the home); under P1-1, the Court held that it could not find in her favor 
because she had failed to adduce "any evidence, such as an independent expert 
evaluation, that would permit a comparison of the full market value of her old flat and 
that of the replacement flat." Id. at para. 3.  In effect, the social relationships that the 
property had enabled her to form could be ignored when determining whether a fair 
balance had been struck under P1-1. (The applicant eventually succeeded in further 
proceedings regarding the failure of the authorities to transfer title to the replacement flat: 
see the judgment issued  by the Court on July 21, 2005, Appl. No. 24077/02 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. July 21, 2005).) 
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becomes relevant where the taking of property interferes with some other Convention 
right.142 
It is only in relation to assets used to earn a profit that the Court seems willing to 
adjust the balancing test to reflect the social function of property.  In a number of cases, 
the Court has suggested that commercial property commands a lower level of protection 
than other types of property. In Pine Valley Developments v. Ireland, it stated that an 
owner of land held for commercial development should take the risk that planning 
regulations may make it impossible to earn anticipated profits.143 Similarly, in Gasus, it 
held that the holder of a security interest should recognize that tax authorities may assert 
 
142 For example, in a British case dealing with a trustee in bankruptcy's statutory 
power to seize and sell property of the bankrupt, the national court indicated that the 
power should be subject to safeguards for the protection of personal correspondence.  
Haig v. Aitken, [2001] Ch. 110 (Ch. D.). However, it was the Article 8 right to privacy, 
rather than P1-1, that was relevant. (even so, the discussion of Article 8 was not strictly 
necessary to the decision, although it was "at least strongly arguable" that a seizure and 
sale of the correspondence would infringe" article 8. Haig, [2001] Ch. at 118; cf. Cork v. 
Rawlins, [2001] Ch. 792 (C.A.) (proceeds of a permanent disablement insurance policy 
were not so peculiarly personal that they could not be taken on bankruptcy). 
143 222 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26.  (The withdrawal of a prior provisional grant 
of planning consent caused the property's value to decline to about 10% of its previous 
value. However, a breach of the Article 14 non-discrimination right was found on other 
grounds). 
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a higher-ranking claim to the assets.144 There was no factual basis on which it could be 
said that the owners should have expected these events, except in the most general sense.  
That is, nothing about the specific facts of either case would have suggested that there 
was a greater risk to these property owners than to any other person holding property for 
a commercial purpose.145 In effect, commercial property is not protected as stringently as 
property used for other purposes.  But even so, these cases cannot be taken too far.  They 
concerned the enforcement of regulatory and taxing measures, rather than the deprivation 
of possessions, and so the payment of compensation and the loss of autonomy were not 
the central issues.  In cases on valuation and compensation, the Court does not 
differentiate between types of property and types of property holders.  In the vast 
majority of cases concerning compensation and the fair balance, the function of the 
property and its relationship to the personal interests of the applicant are given little 
weight. 
 
144 Gasus, 306-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 52-53 (the property was rendered 
worthless); see also Bäck v. Finland, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 246 at 266.   
145 In both cases, the state action was unexpected; indeed, in Gasus, 306-B Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A), the holder of the security interest had no means of ascertaining the risk 
that the tax authorities would claim an interest in the assets. It would have been 
impossible to obtain information on the debtor's tax liabilities, and hence on the risk of 
seizure. 
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In conclusion, it does not appear that the Court adopted market standard over 
concerns regarding the difficulty of valuation, and in any case, the fair balance test should 
be flexible enough to resolve any concerns where valuation is difficult.   
B. The market standard as the best approximation of fairness 
The Court's concern with its capacity to manage the growth in its workload is 
most obvious where it deals with large numbers of similar claims.  In these situations, the 
Court has indicated that rigid standards may be preferable to open-ended balancing tests.  
For example, in Lithgow v. United Kingdom, which concerned the valuation of the shares 
of companies that were taken in the nationalization of the aircraft and shipbuilding 
industries, the Court allowed the United Kingdom to ignore the book values of the assets 
of companies in order to simplify the process and avoid delays.146 In James, the Court 
accepted that the legislation would produce "anomalies" and "windfall profits" for some 
tenants, but stated that "the uncertainty, litigation, expense and delay that would 
inevitably be caused for both tenants and landlords under a scheme of individual 
examination of each of many thousands of cases" meant that the scheme as a whole was 
not unreasonable. 147 
146 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 52-54. 
147 The applicants raised the example of tenants who bought end-of-term leases 
before the legislation came into effect, because they would not have paid towards the 
maintenance of the buildings, and yet that was the justification for allowing them to buy 
the leasehold without consideration for the value of the buildings. (James, 98 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) at 42.)   
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In Lithgow and James, it was the state that argued that rigid rules would achieve 
justice.  Often, it is the Court that advances a rigid test, as the choice between the open-
ended  balancing test and fixed rules is dictated by the Court's perception of its ability to 
manage its case load. 148 Once it sees that a particular type of case is likely to recur, it 
tends to adopt very rigid rules that exclude a broader investigation into the facts.149 It is 
only in cases that raise issues that seem unlikely to come back before the Court that it 
emphasizes the open-ended nature of the fair balance.   
This is most clearly illustrated by a series of Italian cases on the delays faced by 
landlords who wished to execute eviction orders against tenants.150 At first, the Court 
held that an excessive delay could upset the fair balance, but it was necessary to take into 
account a variety of factors before reaching a conclusion. For example, in Spadea and 
Scalabrino v. Italy151 and Scollo v. Italy,152 the Court balanced the personal situation of 
 
148 See e.g. Broniowski, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 76-77. 
149 It cannot restrict access by declaring cases inadmissible; as Luzius Wildhaber, 
the President of the Court, has noted, it is "manifestly well-founded applications" that are 
the issue. Luzius Wildhaber, A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human 
Rights, 23 HUMAN RIGHTS L.J. 161 at 163 (2002). 
150 Under Italian law, a landlord must obtain police assistance to enforce an 
eviction order against a residential tenant.  In these cases, the police refused to provide 
assistance, despite requests from the landlord. 
151 315-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996). 
152 315-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996). 
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the tenants against the landlords' need for repossession.  In both cases, the delays in 
obtaining possession were lengthy (six years in Spadea and ten in Scollo), but only in 
Scollo did the Court find that landlord's need outweighed the state's interest in protecting 
the tenant.   
At this point, the Court may have thought that it had given the Italian government 
sufficient guidance to determine similar disputes on their own.  If the Italians had set up a 
system for balancing interests in individual cases, it is likely that it would have 
discharged its obligations under P1-1.153 However, this did not happen, and the Court 
was soon faced with a flood of similar claims from landlords.  It would have been 
impossible to engage in the careful balancing of Spadea and Scollo and still deal with all 
of them within a reasonable time, and the Court soon adopted a more rigid approach.  It is 
now quite clear that delaying possession by more than four years violates P1-1, but 
anything less does not.154 The Court no longer engages in the careful balancing of 
interests that characterized Spadea and Scollo. Plainly, the Court has sought to manage 
the flood of cases, but it has only done so by ignoring the very factors that it had already 
said were essential to the balancing process.   
 
153 See, e.g., Bäck, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. (debt adjustment).
154 See, e.g., Sorrentino Prota v. Italy, Appl. No. 40465/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 29, 
2004) (delays just over four years were violations, id. at para. [70]-[71], but a delay that 
"could have lasted for a period of time between three years and two months and four 
years and one month" was not, id. at para. [59]-[61]). 
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It may be the case that the same concern underpins the approach to the market 
rule.  That is, it does not necessarily represent an abandonment of the integrated theory, 
or indeed of the fair balance and the social model of property, but only a realistic 
appraisal of the likelihood that justice can be provided in every case without 
unreasonable delay.  Perhaps the Court adopted the market value compensation for the 
same reason as the four-year rule in the Italian eviction cases: it believed that it is simpler 
to apply and probably provides a reasonable approximation of the just outcome in most 
cases.155 However, the problems concerning the Court's workload have been caused by 
delays in the execution of judgments, rather than the complexities of the fair balance test 
or the social model of property.156 With the Italian repossession cases, the central 
problem has been the continuing failure of the Italian government to address systemic 
problems in the administration of the law. There was no suggestion that implementing a 
system that reflected the balancing test of Scollo and Spadea was beyond the capacity of 
the Italian civil service or courts; rather, they simply failed to make the changes that were 
required.   
 
155 Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson, Takings, in 2 ENCYLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 328 at 332 (Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, eds., 2000) 
available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/6200book.pdf and 
http://users.ugent.be/~gdegeest/6200book.pdf ("Thus, taking measurement costs into 
account, fair market value may be the best proxy for just compensation."). 
156 Wildhaber, supra note 149.  
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While there is no doubt that delays in the execution of judgments do represent a 
real challenge to the effectiveness of the Convention system, the dilution of the 
substantive content of human rights is not the appropriate method of resolving these 
issues.  They should be addressed directly, through remedial law or non-judicial measures 
of the other organs of the Council of Europe.157 In any case, the Court is inconsistent on 
the use of rigid rules.  There are a number of cases in which the Court has found that 
national rules on expropriation and compensation are insufficiently flexible.  For 
example, a series of cases have dealt with Greek rules that allowed public authorities to 
take offsetting benefits into account when expropriating part of a plot of land for road 
construction.158 While the Court accepted that the principle that offsetting benefits could 
be relevant, it held that it should be open to challenge in specific cases.  The Greek law 
did not allow this, and hence there was a breach of P1-1, despite the saving in 
administrative costs that would be lost.  Lallement also demonstrates that the 
 
157 Recently, the Court began to hand down "pilot judgments": see e.g.,
Broniowski, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R., and Hutten-Czapska, Appl. No. 35014/97.  
Nevertheless, it is apparent that governments are very slow in making systemic changes 
where it is clear that this is required in order to avoid future breaches of P1-1 or other 
Convention rights.  For example, the Court is still dealing with numerous applications 
from Italian landlords on essentially the same matters that were raised in Scollo, 315-C 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) and Spadea, 315-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).    
158 Katikaridis, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R.; Tsomtsos, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R.; 1699; 
Papachelas, 1999-II Eur. Ct. H.R.; Efstathiou, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.   
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determination of the loss cannot always be resolved by simple formulae, even where it 
would reduce the administrative expense and perhaps provide satisfactory justice in the 
majority of cases.159 Even if the market value standard could be defended as the best 
approximation of what the fair balance and social model of property would require in 
most cases, the Court has neither presented nor applied it in that way.  
In conclusion, the objection that the Court has adopted market value as the best 
approximation of the outcome that would be reached by open-ended balancing tests is not 
well-founded.  It may well approximate the outcomes in many cases, but it is doubtful 
that this is the Court's reason for adopting it.  It is far more plausible that the market value 
was adopted out of judicial habit, borrowed from national law and customary 
international law.  In other words, it is the comparative method that has been applied, and 
the integrated theory of Sporrong is only followed occasionally and inconsistently. 
CONCLUSIONS
In Sporrong, it was said that the fair balance provides the basis of substantive 
justice under P1-1.  While the Court has never suggested that human rights do not strike a 
balance between public and private interests, the real question is the centrality of its own 
balancing process in the resolution of issues of substantive justice.  Sporrong suggested 
that the Court ought to decide whether the balance had been struck according to general 
Convention principles.  Moreover, the fair balance test itself is open-ended and vague, 
but this only serves to make relevant the social context in which property rights are 
allocated and exercised.  Hence, the market value of the property is relevant to the 
 
159 Appl. No. 46044/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. April 11, 2002). 
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balancing process, as it indicates the value that the community attach to the property in 
ordinary private transactions; however, it is not conclusive.  It excludes personal 
preferences that should be relevant, as well as general social conditions that justify a re-
shaping of the boundaries of property.  Instead, we find that the Court has often turned 
away from full implications of the integrated theory of Sporrong, in favor of a 
comparative legal method that abstracts both property from social context and the 
principles of a human right to property from those of other human rights. 
